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ABSTRACT 
This thesis outlines a methodology for use by tactical operators to better 
understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are attempting to gain. In 
turn, these operators (Army soldiers, Marines, Special Forces, SEALs, Civil Affairs, etc.) 
can use this information to more effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and 
conduct tactical missions.  Our methodology provides a heuristic model, called the “3 x 5 
P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model,” that can be applied in any environment and will help bridge the 
gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation.  Our acronym is not meant to 
be sarcastic or meant to give the impression that we take this subject lightly; but was 
designed to be memorable in the minds of operators who are already inundated with lists 
of acronyms pertaining to their daily duties.  We believe that our methodology can be 
utilized to increase the operator’s understanding of the environment, and improve both 
non-kinetic and kinetic combat operations.  As a counterinsurgency (COIN) force 
progresses from kinetic combat operations (those attempting to gain a security foothold in 
a non-permissive environment) to operations focused on gaining the support of the 
population, our methodology will aid in collecting human intelligence (HUMINT).  Our 
methodology shows that by providing security, working through locals, building trust and 
cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN 
forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis was motivated by our perception that tactical level American soldiers 
commonly lack a methodology for understanding the dynamics of the populations in 
which they work and how to properly assess these dynamics to gain and maintain a 
population’s support.  These observations are based on eight years of personal 
experiences in the SEAL and Special Forces communities during worldwide 
deployments. We have worked with conventional U.S. Army units, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Iraqi Army, Afghan Army, various South Asian and South East Asian Armed Forces, and 
several militia elements in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
The fundamental theories of counterinsurgency are well known within the U.S. 
military, but the operational art of bridging the gap between strategy and tactics, and 
theory and implementation is difficult.  Our thesis explains a methodology soldiers can 
utilize at the tactical level to better understand the dynamics of the population from which 
they are attempting to gain support. In turn, they can use this information to more 
effectively develop strategy, plan operations, and conduct tactical missions. Our process 
provides a heuristic model, called the “3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model,” which can be 
applied in any environment and which will help bridge the gap between strategic theory 
and tactical implementation.  Our acronym is not meant to be sarcastic or meant to give 
the impression that we take this subject lightly; but rather, it was designed to be 
memorable in the minds of operators who are already inundated with lists of acronyms 
pertaining to their daily duties.   
We recognize that gaining information and carrying out basic governance are 
almost impossible to conduct in a non-permissive environment where forces are 
constantly engaged in direct combat; however, as combat operations enable security and 
the environment becomes more permissive, we believe our methodology can increase the 
tactical level soldiers’ understanding of their environment and can be utilized to improve 
precision kinetic combat missions.  As a COIN force progresses from kinetic combat 
operations in an attempt to gain a security foothold in a non-permissive environment to 
operations focused on gaining the support of the population, this methodology will 
 xiv
facilitate the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT).  This methodology shows that 
by combining the efforts of providing security, working through locals, building trust and 
cooperation, and identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN 
forces will be able to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the 
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I. WHY DO WE NEED A TACTICAL METHODOLOGY TO 
 UNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF A POPULATION?  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was motivated by our perception that tactical level American soldiers 
commonly lack a methodology for understanding the dynamics of the populations in 
which they work and how to properly assess these dynamics in order to gain and maintain 
a population’s support.  These observations are based on eight years of personal 
experiences in the SEAL and Special Forces communities during worldwide 
deployments. We have worked with conventional U.S. Army units, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Iraqi Army, Afghan Army, various South Asian and South East Asian Armed Forces, and 
several militia elements in Iraq and Afghanistan.   
The fundamental theories of counterinsurgency are well known within the U.S. 
military, but the operational art of bridging the gap between strategy and tactics, and 
theory and implementation is difficult.  Our thesis outlines a methodology for 
implementation at the tactical level, and is designed to enable operators to better 
understand the dynamics of the population whose support they are trying to win. In turn, 
this information can lead to more effectively developed strategy, operations planning, and 
tactical missions.  There are surely other methods, but we feel that our process provides a 
heuristic model than can be applied in any environment.  We are confident that it will 
help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation.   
The war in Iraq and the “Anbar Awakening” in particular is a powerful 
illustration of the need to understand and engage the population in order to win a 
counterinsurgency (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 41).  The following story is about 
how Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi locals secured eastern Ramadi during the “Anbar 
Awakening” (MacFarland and Smith, 2008. p. 41).  The “Anbar Awakening” provides a 
real world experience to exemplify the essential ingredients necessary to gain a 
population’s support: provide security, work by, with, and through locals, and build trust 
and cooperation.  History shows that when these tasks are successfully executed a COIN 
force will gain the support of a population.  With this support a COIN force will gain the 
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intelligence advantage and can use that advantage to precisely target the remnants of the 
insurgency (McCormick, 2007). This chapter will begin with a brief overview of the 
Ramadi story, what transpired, and then tell a more detailed story of how Task Force 1-9 
(TF 1-9) and Naval Special Warfare Squadron Five (ST5) assisted in the transformation. 
B. THE TRANSFORMATION OF RAMADI 
Ramadi is the capital of Al Anbar Province in Iraq.  The majority of its populace 
is Sunni Muslim, and is organized and aligned by tribe.  Tribes tend to have geographic 
boundaries, but can have enclaves outside traditional tribal grounds.  For instance, the 
Albu Soda tribe was predominantly situated in Sofia, an eastern suburb of Ramadi, but it 
had direct tribal ties to certain areas deep in Ramadi proper.  Every family, tribe, and 
community within Ramadi is different in how or to what degree they practice Sunni 
Islam.  From personal experience, the areas of Ramadi that are discussed here appeared to 
be relatively secular.1  The majority of people I saw wore western style clothing, 
worshipped privately, and were publicly accepting of Sunnis, Salafis, and Shia Muslims.  
Additionally, people I spoke with were eager to embrace democracy.  Nevertheless, when 
religion was called into question or perceived to be under attack, the inhabitants of 
Ramadi were quick to take up arms in defense of their faith.  The high degree of devotion 
to Sunni Islam was not apparent until Al Qaeda (AQI) stated that Ramadi was the capital 
of Sunni Islam, the Khalifa or Caliphate, and would be defended to the death.  AQI called 
upon Sunnis to take up arms in defense of their religion.  This turned Ramadi into an 
escalating war zone in 2005 (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42).  Furthermore, 
throughout modern history Ramadi has served as an economic hub on the trade routes 
between Syria and Baghdad (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42).  As with any economic 
portal, Ramadi has a complicated history of corruption, trafficking, and organized crime.   
To quantify the insurgency in Ramadi is very difficult; it was made up of many 
different elements with different motivations.  They may have shared desire to end the 
occupation or resist the new Iraqi government, but each element had different goals and 
objectives it hoped to reach through violence.  To some it was all about killing 
                                                 
1  LT Burke was in Ramadi, Iraq, from September 2006 until April 2007. His personal insights and 
experiences are the basis for the account of what transpired in Ramadi written in this thesis.   
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Americans.  To others it was about defending Islam against hegemony by western 
influence.  Some were just anti-occupation and some just needed money and were willing 
to fight for pay, services, protection, and status.  Moreover, Ramadi was ripe with 
recruits.  Debaathification, the disbanding of the Iraqi military, political alienation by the 
new regime, economic destruction, and families that lacked the means to attain their daily 
subsistence created the perfect disequilibrated society for the insurgency to develop and 
prosper.  Specifically, AQI took interest in Ramadi because of its Sunni predominance, 
recruiting potential, and logistical suitability. 
Fighting the Al Qaeda backed insurgency (AQI) in Ramadi, U.S. and Iraqi 
military forces (CF) capitalized on AQI’s military blunders and cultural insensitivity to 
gain a new level of cooperation with Sunni tribes (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 41).  
Initially, AQI was able to gain a foothold through a strategy of coercion, by religious 
affiliation, and by supplying a means to ordinary daily needs lacked by the restless 
society.  Prior to the Awakening, Al Qaeda operatives and affiliates operated with virtual 
impunity within Ramadi and the outlying villages (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 42).  
They imposed their Salafi religious traditions on Sunni tribes.  Al Qaeda conducted terror 
campaigns, assassinations, and other violent acts to deter CF support within the local 
populace; anyone who supported CF was murdered (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, pp. 
42-43, 47, 49).  As CF attempted to combat Al Qaeda and its supporters the local 
population was often inadvertently caught in the crossfire.  The fighting caused massive 
collateral damage, often leaving non-combatants homeless, wounded, or dead.   However, 
Al Qaeda miscalculated the degree of tribal empathy for their cause, and the tribes 
eventually chose to side with CF (MacFarland and Smith, 2008. pp. 41-52).  Gaining 
valuable intelligence from their new allies, CF, Iraqi Police, local militias, and brave 
civilians quickly secured Ramadi.  In eastern Ramadi, the Albu Soda tribe provided the 
key ingredient to success that CF had needed for so long (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, 
pp. 49-51). 
In September, 2006, Ramadi started turning around and tribal leaders began to 
cooperate with CF (MacFarland and Smith, 2008, p. 44).  In Eastern Ramadi and the 
adjacent outlying suburbs, the catalyst for progress was the relationship between the Albu 
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Soda tribe, TF 1-9, and ST5.  Fortunately, TF1-9 and ST5 capitalized on the local 
populace’s growing disdain for Al Qaeda at the tribal level and logically fell into a 
“ground-up” counterinsurgency strategy (MacFarland and Smith, 2008. pp. 49-51).   
 















Within the Ramadi area, Albu Soda was a relatively small tribe that resided 
northeast of Ramadi in an area known as Sofia (see Figures 1 & 2).  Due to the 
overwhelming distribution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), CF soldiers were 
relegated to foot-patrols close to Forward Operation Bases (FOBs); Albu Soda territory 
had for a long time been unreachable due to the relative long distance from any CF base 
by foot, Al Qaeda check points along the foot paths, and IED riddled streets.  Mortars 
were launched daily at CF installations in Ramadi from Albu Soda’s fields.  The fact that 
the area was an Al Qaeda stronghold made the area one of keen interest to CF, but the 
U.S. military could not gain adequate intelligence or any sustained presence in the area 
due to overwhelming Al Qaeda control. 
Sheik Jassim of the Albu Soda tribe maintained his position of authority by aiding 
and abetting AQI for many years; but in the early days of December 2006, tensions came 
to a head.   Sheik Jassim grew tired of Al Qaeda’s destructiveness and tribal government 
oppression; he was tired of Al Qaeda’s coercion and terror.  Fearing a total Al Qaeda take 
over and his assassination, he ordered his tribe to deny Al Qaeda sanctuary and take up 
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arms against them.  In return for his heretical pronouncement, Al Qaeda turned on the 
tribe and murdered 36 men, women, and children in a barbaric attack on the village 
center.  Members of Sheik Jassim’s loyal militia attempted to fight back, but were 
defeated. 
Sheik Jassim went into hiding, but, through back channels, was able to contact the 
U.S. Army’s, TF 1-9, based at Corregidor (see Figure 1).  TF 1-9 responded, and, in an 
unpredictable move, drove directly into the once denied territory to secure the sheik.  
Sheik Jassim was brought back to Corregidor, debriefed, and offered amnesty under strict 
terms: CF would reinstate him into the tribe, CF would provide security until his tribe 
was able to do so unilaterally, and in turn, Sheik Jassim would give information vital to 
combating Al Qaeda, and supporting a permanent CF presence within his tribal 
boundaries.  He agreed and 24 hours later Sheik Jassim was escorted back into his tribal 
lands. 
CF linked up with Sheik Jassim’s militia and established joint security positions 
anticipating a daylight attack by Al Qaeda; an attack that never happened.  The sheik’s 
tribe provided information regarding Al Qaeda’s escape to Jalayba once they realized that 
CF had been inserted into the village.  The CF show of force, willingness to fight on 
behalf of the Albu Soda tribe, and the sustained security presence led to widespread 
support from the tribe.  Overnight, mortar attacks of Corregidor stopped and violence 
within the Albu Soda territory ceased.  The populations’ support yielded new information 
on the insurgency, its caches, its tactics, and its safe havens enabling CF to perform 
precision raids.  Coming full circle, the tribe became more secure under the umbrella of 
protection provided by CF armed with the locals’ intelligence. 
After the first couple days of the campaign, the emphasis changed from security 
and offensive operations to providing civic needs and training the militia.  All military 
and civic programs were orchestrated and coordinated through one single position: the 
unified command structure of TF 1-9’s Battalion Commander.  Under TF 1-9’s authority, 
ST5 was responsible for training the local militia and began the process of transforming 
them into a legitimate police force. This required screening, training, equipping, paying, 
and establishing a command structure.  In order to legitimize the force, volunteers had to 
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agree to attend one of the police academies accredited by the Iraqi government.  These 
conditions required that police recruits leave their homes and families for up to two 
months depending upon the school: a considerable sacrifice given the conflict their tribe 
had just experienced and the concern for their family’s security in the forefront of their 
minds.  Despite these requirements, the approximately 30-man militia that helped CF the 
first night of the campaign showed up in force for the first day of training.  The feeble 
militia had grown to hundreds of volunteers.  Word had spread of AQI’s brutality and the 
CF’s new alliance, which motivated hundreds of men and boys to want to join the cause.  
Due to the sheer numbers, three separate courses of instruction were organized.  Many 
volunteers proved to be ex-detainees with criminal backgrounds including actions such 
as: mortaring CF facilities, building and emplacing IEDs, and even a member of a 
beheading cell.  Despite their past transgressions, these ex-insurgents were given 
amnesty.  Based on intelligence gleaned from the police recruits ST5 was able to further 
its area influence and raid AQI safe havens in neighboring tribes and even in Ramadi 
proper (see Figure 1).  Ultimately, the first three courses of instruction yielded 176 
trained, equipped, and funded militia policemen.  They were considered militia 
policemen until they attended one of the accredited Iraqi Police academies, which was 
arranged for 30 of the officers within weeks of graduation from the ST5 course of 
instruction. 
While ST5 conducted police training and intelligence gathering, TF 1-9 provided 
area security and spearheaded Civil Affairs missions.  CF employed locals to fix the local 
power plant, and provided generators and gasoline to those without a power resource.  
They contracted locals to prepare food for the soldiers and police recruits, and employed 
local mechanics to fix generators, plows and miscellaneous equipment.  They rented 
empty houses for CF berthing, and renovated abandoned buildings to operate as police 
stations.  CF contracted locals to clean up the trash along the sides of roads: trash was 
notoriously used to hide IEDs.  The most important milestone was the development of 
democratic elections for local positions of authority: Sheik Jassim was voted head of the 
tribal council, while a neighboring tribal Sheik, Sheik Abbass, was elected to head the 
multi-tribal militia police force.  CF and the militia police provided such a high level of 
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security that the residents gained enough confidence to hold a market, re-open their 
stores, and send their children back to school.  All these programs combined built local 
support for CF, controlled the populace, and gained the information advantage. 
In a matter of weeks, ST5 supplied the tribe with a self-reliant police force 
capable of securing their tribal boundaries while TF 1-9 re-energized the tribe’s economy 
and set in motion democratic ideals to further the divide with Al Qaeda.  News of 
security, economic prosperity, and an end to Al Qaeda’s destructiveness traveled fast and 
wide.  Albu Soda quickly became a model that neighboring tribes envied.  Sheik Jassim 
joined efforts with Sheik Sattar of the Albu Rishawi tribe in western Ramadi and pledged 
to form a tribal coalition against Al Qaeda.  Tribal sheiks from all over Ramadi, and even 
some who had fled the country, traveled to see firsthand the progress and made oaths to 
cooperate with CF.  Sheik Jassim’s house became the local conference center.  As sheiks 
and their advisors came to speak with Sheik Jassim and the TF 1-9 Battalion 
Commander, members of ST5 were there to capitalize on new intelligence resources and 
pledges of new police recruits.  The intelligence overlapped into western Ramadi and 


























Operating without boundaries, ST5 apprehended dozens of insurgents including 
multiple high value individuals and cell leaders throughout the entirety of Ramadi and its 
outlying areas.  In a relatively short period of approximately three months, most of 
Ramadi and its associated outlying villages were stabilized.  However, parts of Ramadi 
proper were still plagued by pockets of insurgent fanatics willing to die, rather than 
retreat. 
TF 1-9 prioritized the outlying villages and applied similar templates as they 
moved into other previously Al Qaeda dominated areas and tribes.  Eventually, TF 1-9 
isolated eastern Ramadi proper by controlling all the surrounding territory.  The Ma’laab 
district of Ramadi was such an insurgent stronghold that TF 1-9 conducted a major 
clearance offensive, similar to the assault on Fallujah in November of 2004 (see Figure 
3).  Despite the environmental and situational similarities between Fallujah and Ramadi, 
there was no mass exodus of civilian non-combatants out of the Ma’laab.  This played 
into the hands of CF providing an opportunity to conduct a census as they conducted their 
house-to-house assault.  Armed with the information of the census, combined with the 
intelligence pouring in from the local population, CF virtually expunged all remaining 
insurgents in eastern Ramadi.  Additionally, the local populace quickly reported on little 
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pockets of resistance remaining elsewhere in Ramadi and these were neutralized.  CF 
pushed out of its bases and occupied permanent facilities in downtown Ramadi.  CF 
employed and empowered local Iraqi Policemen and the Iraqi Army to secure the city 
block by block, opening opportunities for CF Civil Affairs elements to re-invigorate the 
economy. 
CF empowered local security forces and put the Iraqis back in control.  CF 
achieved the essential ingredients required to gain the support of the population: provided 
security, worked by, with, and though the local population, and built trust and 
cooperation with the community.  For eastern Ramadi, once the Albu Soda tribe aligned 
with CF, the transformation was relatively fast. The battle for Ramadi had been ongoing 
for years.  
Many men and women, military and civilian, had been killed, wounded, or 
rendered homeless during the years of fighting in Ramadi.  The Anbar Awakening 
quickly turned Ramadi around, but CF had spent years inching toward success, bravely 
fighting, and slowly gaining a hard won foothold.  Moreover, efforts to maintain the 
support of the community are still ongoing today and will continue indefinitely by the 
Iraqi state.  Though ultimately successful, a more systematic methodology would have 
enhanced understanding of the population, provided a common operating picture (COP), 
and more rapid and efficient insurgent kinetic targeting. 
C. THE WAY AHEAD 
We believe the methodology we propose here will help tactical level soldiers 
understand the dynamics of the populations whose support they seek,  and lead to similar 
success more efficiently with less cost of blood and treasure.  We recognize that these 
COIN tactics are almost impossible to conduct in a non-permissive environment where 
forces are constantly engaged in direct combat; however, as the environment becomes 
more permissive, we believe our methodology can be utilized to increase the tactical level 
soldier’s understanding of the environment, to improve strategy, and to better facilitate 
kinetic combat missions.  As a COIN force gains a security foothold and progresses from 
kinetic combat operations to a non-permissive environment to operations focused on 
gaining the support of the population, this methodology will also aid in collecting human 
 11
intelligence (HUMINT).  This methodology shows that by combining the efforts of 
providing security, working through locals, building trust and cooperation, and 
identifying opportunities to leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able 
to separate the populace from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, and 








































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 13
II. COUNTERINSURGENCY 101  
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Key to Counterinsurgency: Popular Support 
This chapter will discuss widely accepted theories and tenets of insurgency in 
order to justify the application of our methodology.  Our methodology is based on the 
assumption that the center of gravity for an insurgency and a counterinsurgency is the 
ability to control the population each side seeks to govern.  Understanding that the 
population holds the resources for either the insurgency or counterinsurgency to be 
successful leads one to ask the question: how can either side gain the support of the 
population?  Our methodology offers an important first step in winning the support of the 
population—a heuristic tool to help understand the dynamics of a population, specifically 
its subgroups, and their needs.  By identifying a population’s subgroups and their needs, 
it is possible to understand which needs are not being met and possibly use this as an 
opportunity for engagement.    It is our opinion that by understanding the dynamics of a 
population, providing security, working through locals, and building trust and 
cooperation, that COIN forces can gain the support of the population and defeat an 
insurgency.   
 This chapter has two parts. The first section begins with an overview of literature 
on the causes, characteristics, and tactics of insurgency.  It stresses that insurgencies are 
wars for populations and whichever side gains the support of the population wins the 
battle. The second section outlines Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model and 
how it explains the relationship between the state, counter state (insurgency), population, 
and international actors.   Additionally, it explains the advantages and disadvantages of 
the stakeholders, their goals and tactics, and likely mistakes.  The goal behind explaining 
the “Mystic Diamond” is to help the reader better understand the dynamics of insurgency 
and also point out where our methodology fits into the COIN process. 
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B. WHAT IS INSURGENCY? 
1. An Internal Struggle for Control 
Insurgency describes the violent struggle between an internal faction and the 
ruling government.  An insurgency starts from an idea or grievance and grows, producing 
leaders who inspire or coerce the population to follow them or at least remain neutral 
while they gain resources, grow, and conduct anti-government operations (Galula, 2006, 
p. 2). Writing in the 1950s,  French insurgency expert David Galula describes insurgency 
as, “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific 
intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order” (2006, p. 
2). His description highlights that the struggle is enduring and formulated to break the 
government’s will and popular support.  
Generally speaking, there are two main motivators that lead to insurgency: the 
population’s perception of one or more injustices committed by the government, or a 
difference in ideologies between a group within the population and the state (O’Neill, 
2005, p. 19).  Essentially, insurgencies are designed to combat governments that do not 
meet the needs of the population, have alienated some portion of the population, or have 
an opposing ideology (O’Neill, 2005, p. 19).  For example, Mao Tse Tung describes an 
environment ripe for insurgency, writing: “A potential revolutionary situation exists in 
any country where the government consistently fails in its obligation to ensure at least a 
minimally decent standard of life for the great majority of its citizens” (1965, p. 8).  In 
every state there exists some counter state element that disagrees with the ruling 
government; the extent to which they gain support from the population determines 
whether or not the movement will evolve into an insurgency.   
Insurgencies can also be motivated by differing ideologies.  O’Neill further 
develops this idea: “Non-ruling groups may resort to violence to change existing social, 
economic, or political policies that they believe discriminate against particular groups 
(e.g., ethnic, religious, racial, or economic) in the population” (O’Neill, 2005, p. 19).    
For example, communism played a large role in the insurgencies in Vietnam and Latin 
America from the 1950s-1970s...  In today’s world, Western societies face a global 
insurgency being waged by proponents of political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism.   
 15
Counterinsurgencies are fundamentally different from conventional wars and 
require different tools and tactics.  Conventional war is defined by two or more states’ 
militaries engaging in combat with the goal of defeating the other’s military and 
compelling its government to change its policies2.  John Nagl describes this difference 
between conventional warfare and counter insurgency saying: 
While the primary challenge of conventional warfare is massing firepower 
at the appropriate place and time to destroy the enemy, the key to success 
in counterinsurgency is massing intelligence derived from the local 
population to identify the enemy; the counterinsurgent is literally dying for 
that information (Galula, 2006, p. vii). 
 
In conventional war, armies are focused on gaining a geographic advantage that 
enables them to destroy their adversary’s forces. Nagl explains, on the other hand, that, 
“Key terrain in an insurgency is not a physical space, but the political acquiescence of the 
people who inhabit that space” (Galula, 2006, p. ix).   
It is important to not only to know the difference between conventional warfare 
and insurgency, but also some nuances of terminology commonly associated with 
insurgency.  Defining terms such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, people’s war, and low 
intensity conflict is a slippery slope.  There is no consensus on an exact definition, but for 
the sake of this thesis, terrorism and guerilla warfare are tactics that insurgents can 
incorporate into their struggle; however, they do not mean insurgency.  The word 
terrorism is used to describe operations conducted to terrorize the population and cause a 
reaction from the state that further alienates the state from the population (Hoffman, 
1998, p. 43).  Guerilla warfare is used to describe insurgent operations that indirectly 
attack conventional forces; not force on force focused operations designed to attrit 
enemy’s forces (McCormick, 1999, pp. 23-33).  Similarly, terms such as people’s war, 
revolution, rebellion, and low intensity conflict are used as synonyms for insurgency 
(McCormick, 1999, pp. 23-33).  There are nuances and differences in definitions that  
 
                                                 
2 However, it is important to keep in mind that conventional war can also be used to describe when an 
insurgency goes head to head in attrition warfare with the government’s security forces.  This may occur in 
the later stages of an insurgency when the counter state has grown large enough and acquired conventional 
military means to directly attack the government’s forces as in the example of the Tet Offensive (1968). 
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academics can argue, but for the sake of this thesis and its brief overview of insurgency 
and counterinsurgency the terms people’s war, revolution, rebellion, and low intensity 
conflict will be used synonymously. 
Much has been written about counterinsurgency, but despite the level of attention 
it has received, there is no controversy over what is at the heart of the matter:  controlling 
the population.  Historical and acclaimed academics such as Clausewitz, Mao Tse Tung, 
Nathan Leites, Charles Wolf, David Galula, Gordon McComick and many others agree 
that the struggle in an insurgency is a competition for the control of the population.  In 
the Forward to David Galula’s book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 
John Nagl states, “An insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for 
the support of the civilian population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent 
swims” (Galula, 2006, p. viii).  An insurgency wants to overthrow the government, but it 
cannot do this without the support or at least neutrality of the population (Galula, 2006, p. 
53).  Mao Tse Tung says, “The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of 
the people” (1966, p. 260).  This thesis focuses on the competition for the population and 
explains a methodology designed to help counterinsurgent forces understand the 
dynamics of a population and identify opportunities for the state to engage and “win” the 
population. 
In an insurgency, a population has three choices: side with the insurgency, remain 
neutral, or side with the government (Galula, 2006, p. 53).  Galula discusses this 
relationship: “In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the 
cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause” (Galula, 2006, p. 53).  
The first two choices result in advantages to the insurgent.  He must only remain invisible 
to the state to survive, and this provides him time in order to sway or coerce the 
population to his favor.  Conversely, if the population sides with the government then the 
insurgency will likely never gain traction or if it has already gained momentum it will be 
quickly stopped.  Mao further puts the importance of the population in context saying: 
This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is 
indeed of the greatest importance.  We have dwelt on it at the risk of 
repetition precisely because victory is impossible without it.  There are, or 
course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political 
mobilization is the most fundamental (1966, p. 260). 
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Therefore, the key question that both opposing sides must attempt to answer is: how do 
they control a population?   
The tactics used to wage the insurgent’s war vary and may transform with time 
and as the insurgency grows or wanes (McCormick, Horton, Harrison, 2007, pp. 322-
323).  Situations similar to what Mao describes may be present all over the world, but it 
takes motivated leadership to capitalize on the ripe environment and grow an insurgency 
(Galula, 2006, p. 2).  If it grows large enough to counter the government, an insurgency 
may even take on the form of a conventional war, but only at the moment the insurgency 
has reached full maturity.  O’Neill lays out insurgent tactics writing:   
Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and 
the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses 
political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and 
demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis 
of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (2005, p. 15). 
 
As an insurgency develops and grows, the insurgent forces usually engage in terrorist and 
guerrilla operations designed to produce a reaction from the government’s security 
forces: these cause collateral damage and alienate the general population and further 
justify the insurgent’s cause (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 48).  All too often states are more 
than willing to fall into the insurgent’s trap and use heavy-handed violence to respond 
(Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 36).  Again, this only furthers the insurgents cause and 
supports their propaganda (Leites and Wolf, 1970, pp. 36, 55).  It is easy to read 
historical accounts of insurgency and counter insurgency and point at ill-conceived 
operations, but the purpose of this thesis is to help defeat insurgency and therefore study 
properly executed operations and engagements.   
Knowing the insurgent’s tactics is half the battle for the state, the other half is 
knowing how and when to respond and in what manner.  The goal in a counterinsurgency 
should be to gain the support of the population so that they will disavow the insurgents 
and deny them safe haven, resources, and manpower.  Security forces must take every 
precaution to limit collateral damage—injuring the population or its resources—when 
conducting kinetic operations.  They should focus on getting the support of the people in 
order to increase the actionable intelligence.  Nagl says, “The government should target 
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the insurgents armed with specific, local information derived from long and close 
association with the population” (Galula, 2006, p. viii).   
Once insurgent elements have been removed or pushed out of an area, that area 
must remain a priority to the counterinsurgency.  It is natural for a military to want to 
chase fleeing insurgents, but they must not if it requires giving up control of recently 
cleared areas.  Galula explains: 
The problem is how to keep an area clean so that the counterinsurgent 
forces will be free to operate elsewhere.  This can be achieved only with 
the support of the population…The populace, therefore, becomes the 
objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy (2006, p. 52). 
 
Again, counter insurgency theory experts stipulate that the civilian population is the heart 
of the contest between insurgent and state; therefore, it follows that engaging the 
population is the critical component of counterinsurgency strategy. As insurgents are able 
to maintain dark networks, invisible to the state’s countering forces, it is incumbent upon 
the countering force to engage the population, so as to learn the whereabouts of the 
elusive insurgents. Engaging the population takes many forms, but at the general level it 
implies the use of various incentives and disincentives to sway the population and 
convince it that their future lies with the state, rather than with the insurgents.  
Counterinsurgents face a dangerous temptation when fighting an insurgency.  The 
state, which has a force advantage, is naturally inclined to engage in an asymmetric war 
that plays into the hand of the insurgency (Galula, 2006, pp. 3-4, 44-45).  However, with 
the right focus of effort, counterinsurgency can be successful.  All elements of a nation’s 
power must be aimed at gaining the support of the population, or in other words massing 
the political will of the population.  This can be achieved by working through local 
leaders, and building trust and cooperation.  Military operations should only be conducted 
when they support the goals of gaining better intelligence for fighting the insurgency, 
separating the population from the insurgents, and minimizing collateral damage.  In 
order to accomplish this it is essential to understand the relationship dynamics between 
the state, population, insurgency, and outside actors.   
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C. DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS IN A COUNTERINSURGENCY 
1. Competition for Control of the Population 
An insurgency starts from nothing. In order to grow it must capitalize on 
opportunities afforded to it by the state as it lacks control of the insurgents’ environment 
(McCormick 1999, pp. 25-26).  In order to grow, the counter state must control the 
population where they can, maintain anonymity with the state, and use their freedom of 
maneuver and secrecy to recruit, grow, and spread their propaganda (McCormick, 1999, 
pp. 25-26).  In order to win the population over, the state must extend its power to the 
village level and deny the counter state’s freedom of maneuver.  Moreover, state needs to 
be at the village level to know the population and its vulnerabilities.  This will help the 
state identify social and infrastructure needs and will likely produce intelligence 
resources to better fight the insurgency.  Hopefully, if the state is able to push its 
influence down to the village level it will not have to kinetically fight the insurgency; but 
rather, it will fight the insurgency by understanding the needs of the population and 
attempting to address these needs.   
Security is the essential ingredient that will allow the state to extend its influence.  
Kinetic operations are sometimes required to break into non-permissive environments.  
Kinetic operations are a way to gain an initial foothold of security, but it is then vital that 
the COIN force moves to a strategy designed to gain intelligence, address civil 
grievances, and conduct precision raids on insurgent holdouts.  Again, in a COIN 
environment, violence is a way in, but not a means to an ends.  Depending upon the 
amount of civilian buy-in to the government, the state must control the populace through 
coercion (Leites and Wolfe, 1970, pp. 11, 33).  In this case coercion means using force, 
threatening force, denying resources, or threatening the denial of resources to gain the 
compliance of a person or group; even threatening to publicly announce one’s 
involvement with CF could be a tool to coerce (Schelling, 1966, pp. 4-5,167,172) (Leites 
and Wolf, 1970, p. 33).  Furthermore, the amount of the population controlled by the state 
is directly related to the amount they do not control; the amount that a state does not 
control provides the opportunity for the insurgency to attempt to maneuver and gain 
control (McCormick, 2007).  Thus, controlling the population is a zero sum game 
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(McCormick, 2007).  Kinetic operations and coercion are not a long term strategy, nor 
are they sustainable, but they are a means to gain an initial foothold and help COIN 
forces provide the all important security that is required to gather intelligence from the 
populace and build genuine consensus and security.  Bottom line, it is essential that the 
regime in power extend its control down to the lowest levels; the state must have 
instruments of control down through the national, provincial, city, and village levels.  
Again, this depth and breadth of control is directly related to the amount of unforced 
support the general populace has for the government (Leites and Wolfe, 1970, p. 11).   
This process and dynamic relationship is illustrated in Gordon McCormick’s 
“Mystic Diamond,” which outlines the struggle for power between a state and counter 
state, their relationship to the population, and the position of international actors 
(McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).   
 
























To understand the “Mystic Diamond,” it is vital to highlight the inherent 
advantages that each side has.  The state typically has an overwhelming advantage of 
force; conversely, the counter state has an information advantage (McCormick, 2007) 
(Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).  The state has government and military infrastructure, money, 
and manning; whereas, the counter state is trying to attain support: specifically, people, 
guns, and money (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).  Due to the nature of the 
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clandestine world from which the counter state must grow, it has an information 
advantage within the immediate populace (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).  
The counter state controls how overt and public they want to be according to their 
insurgent strategy (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).  The natural 
disadvantage of a large bureaucratic organization is a lack of ground level intelligence.  
Ultimately, the people are the key for either the counter state to gain momentum and 
eventual control, or the state to suppress the uprising and maintain control (McCormick, 
2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).   
The goal for both the counter state and the state is to control the population.  The 
state and counter state must engage in tactics to first gain control of the population 
represented by Tactic 1 on the “Mystic Diamond” diagram (McCormick, 2007).  Once 
either side has engaged the population, they will receive feedback for their actions.  This 
feedback can be positive or negative.  The state is looking for feedback in the form of 
intelligence, while the counter state is hoping for support generally characterized as 
people, guns, and money.  The feedback loop is ongoing throughout the entire process 
(McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).   
Once feedback is received from the populace, the state or counter state can engage 
in Tactic 2 (McCormick, 2007) (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13).  Tactic 2 focuses on attacking 
the mechanisms by which the opponent controls the population. The goal for the state and 
counter state is to sever control mechanisms established in Tactic 1. Not until Tactics 1 
and 2 have been successfully completed is it advantageous for either side to engage in 
Tactic 3, directly targeting the opposing enemy.  If either side engages in direct force on 
force combat without good intelligence then they will cause collateral damage, alienate 
the population, and give credit to their adversary’s propaganda and cause. 
As history shows, many states and insurgencies have received external support 
from international players.  Tactics 4 and 5 address the international support lines and 
infrastructure that external actors supply, such as logistics line for importing arms, 
ammunition, and advisors.  If attacking the logistical lines of support from international 
stakeholders isn’t effective then the state can attack the actual international players.  If a 
state is bogged down in trying to suppress an insurgency it will probably be reluctant to 
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engage in war with an international player, but the option does exist.  A prime example of 
this is the war in Iraq today.  Iran is providing support to the insurgency in many ways.  
CF are attempting to engage the logistics lines of support, but are reluctant to directly 
engage Iran.  However, if either side has effectively conducted Tactics 1, 2, and 3, and 
taken advantage of the feedback they have received from via their control of the 
population, then Tactics 4 and 5 should be easy or unnecessary.   In essence, at this point 
the state controls the information, has cut off the support from the population, and is able 
to directly combat the insurgency.  External support for the insurgency from international 
actors can be easily identified and denied with the support and information from the 
population.  
All too often, states mismanage counterinsurgencies and try to directly combat 
insurgency without the support of the population; this costs the state both popular support 
and good intelligence (Galula, 2006, pp. 3-4, 44-45).  Conventional militaries are not 
designed to operate in the realm of the insurgent process because they are trained to 
conduct direct action combat missions and are kinetically inclined.  Conventional 
militaries are created to defend their homeland and attack an enemy’s.  They tend to 
focus their training on military tactics that pertain to directly fighting the enemy in a war 
of attrition.  Because of this focus, it is far stretch to change their mentality to be focused 
on gaining the support of the local population.  If a conventional military overreacts to 
insurgent attacks then it will likely cause collateral damage.  The insurgency will use the 
collateral damage for propaganda and further alienate the state from the population.  This 
happens all too often, so it is important for a conventional military to know its own 
tendencies and have tactical patience while they try to gain support from the population 
and accurate, timely intelligence.  Good intelligence concerning the enemy allows the 
state to minimize collateral damage while increasing their effectiveness in combating the 
insurgency. 
The ground-up principles of controlling the populace diagramed in McCormick’s 
“Mystic Diamond” have been operationalized in the counterinsurgency efforts being 
waged in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and emphasized here with respect to CF in 
Ramadi, Iraq (Wendt, 2005, pp. 1-13) (Wilson, 2006, pp. 2-12).    There are multiple 
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reasons for success in Al Anbar, but one key tenet of counterinsurgency that has been 
exemplified is gaining the support of the population.  After gaining this support, 
Coalition Forces attained actionable intelligence, which allowed it to capture, kill or drive 
out the insurgents. CF could have done this quicker and more effectively if it had 
engaged the population sooner. The following chapter will explain what we believe to be 
the two critical qualities essential for beginning a counterinsurgency campaign: 
understanding the population’s group affiliations, and assessing its needs / motivation.  
Our methodology will directly affect Tactic 1 of McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” and 
help a COIN force gain an understanding of the dynamics of the population and their 
needs.  With this knowledge we hope that the COIN force can identify and capitalize on 
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III. POPULATION 101 
A. ACADEMIC STUDIES: USEFUL FOUNDATIONS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING POPULATIONS 
Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what 
the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand 
what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we 
serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least 
diminish their support and aid to the enemy. 
Major General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, CJTF-76, 
Afghanistan, 2006 (Kipp et al., 2006). 
 
The previous section reviewed contemporary counter-insurgency theories to 
emphasize the central important role played by the population. Ultimately, counter-
insurgency is a struggle for control of the population, or, as insurgency expert Gordon 
McCormick frequently states, “The population is the prize.” (McCormick, 2007) As such, 
it then follows that the next step is to understand the intricacies of the targeted 
population, dissect it, and to determine how to “win” it. 
This section will briefly explore the social sciences of anthropology, sociology, 
and psychology to introduce the reader to the academic fields that have been developed to 
make sense of populations. There is a large body of scholarship in these social sciences. 
A plethora of detailed information exists to allow a better understanding the nuances of 
populations, and their interaction. Theories and literature cover a diverse array of subjects 
from the Freud’s concept of the id and ego to Marx concept of class struggles (Freud, 
1923) (Marx, 1847). For the purpose of this thesis, we have chosen to focus on the fields 
of anthropology, sociology, and psychology to extrapolate general theories useful to the 
tactical operator.  The end-state of this endeavor is to explore the utility and methodology 
of each approach to help frame our pragmatic approach to understanding a designated 
population. In turn, this analysis allows the state to form a strategy toward achieving the 
critical relationship it must establish with a population.  
While these academic approaches each offer understandable explanations as to 
how human populations form, interrelate, communicate and exchange, this thesis argues 
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that all explanations must be considered holistically in order to reach and influence each 
subgroup through an overarching strategy. These viewpoints in mind, the rest of this 
section will discuss the sciences of population as applicable to this method.  
1. Anthropology 
Cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. 
American ideas of what is “normal” or “rational” are not universal. To the 
contrary, members of other societies often have different notions of 
rationality, appropriate behavior, level of religious devotion, and norms 
concerning gender (FM 3-24, 2006. Section 1-80). 
 
 Recent emphasis on counter-insurgency, peace-keeping operations (PKO), and 
stability operations have lead the United States Government (USG), international 
organizations and non-governmental organizations to seek better understanding of their 
geographical and human environments. These efforts have lead many to the field of 
anthropology.  
According to the University of California at Los Angeles Department of 
Anthropology website:  
Anthropology, the broadest of the social sciences, is the study of 
humankind. One of the strengths of anthropology as a discipline is its 
"holistic" or integrative approach; it links the life sciences and the 
humanities and has strong ties with disciplines ranging from biology and 
psychology to linguistics, political science, and the fine arts (University of 
California Los Angeles, 2008).  
 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines anthropology as, “the science of human 
beings; especially: the study of human beings and their ancestors through time and space 
and in relation to physical character, environmental and social relations, and culture” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2008). Compared to sociology, anthropology emphasizes the 
importance of cultural understanding. Anthropologists’ methodology involves in-depth 
field research investigating their targeted population through interview, observation, 
archeological research, biological research, psychology, linguistics, and religion. The 
methodology is designed to reveal patterns, relationships, and values within the studied 
population, and relies on the scientific and other research methods to achieve its results. It 
should be stressed here that anthropological approaches vary widely depending upon the 
researcher, his background, and intent of the study.  
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In 2003, two years after intervention into Afghanistan and shortly after the Iraq 
invasion, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) set out to respond to field requests for 
better “cultural intelligence.” Their answer was to employ civilian anthropologists to seek 
non-military advice on what make local populations tick. In 2007, DoD deployed the first 
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) embedded with U.S. Combat Brigades. The Human 
Terrain System (HTS) is designed to develop a working knowledge of U.S. areas of 
interest, to advise individual soldiers, field commanders, and policy-makers, and maintain 
a cultural database (Kipp et al, 2006)(Rhode, 2007). With respect to the consideratoin of 
cultural data in operational planning, this program has been compared to the U.S. Marine 
Corps Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program developed 
during the Vietnam War,  in which, the Marine Corps created an interagency through, by, 
with program to pacify southern Vietnamese Provinces (Kipp et al, 2006).  
The employment of anthropologists by the USG is not new, and is not without 
contrversy. Criticism arises from academics who view the use of anthropology to 
infuence poplulations along a USG agenda as unethical; as an un-objective lens on 
studied populations (Beyerstein, 2007).  We include the controversy in this section not to 
dissuade the reader from this valuable resource, to advise him of the friction he may 
encounter in certain applications of anthropology to government operations.  
The methodology presented in this thesis is not designed to replace 
anthropological expertise or endeavor.  Rather, access to anthropologists will increase the 
operator’s knowledge of his working environment, and can be used or set aside as 
necessary. Anthropology is therefore a complimentary effort to this method and should 
be viewed positively.  
2. Sociology  
 Sociology emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries as philosophers sought to 
understand the inner-workings of society. It is defined by Merriam-Webster as, “the 
science of society, social institutions, and social relationships; specifically: the systematic 
study of the development, structure, interaction, and collective behavior of organized 
groups of human beings” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). This social science is another broad 
umbrella under which populations are understood, and arguably one of the most holistic, 
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yet scientific, of the social sciences. Under this umbrella, many notable sociologists have 
developed theories designed to better enable us to understand dynamics between people, 
and to aid the layman in making sense of complex human structures. According to the 
University of North Carolina’s Sociology Department, “At its most basic, sociology is an 
attempt to understand and explain the way that individuals and groups interact within a 
society” (University of North Carolina, 2007). For our purpose here, we hope to isolate 
characteristics useful in understanding a designated population. The following paragraphs 
will highlight the efforts of some of the most noteworthy sociologists, and their 
contributions to the field. 
Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) is described as one of the founders of sociology. In 
the earliest days of sociology, thinkers, such as Durkheim, attempted to apply a scientific 
methodological approach to understanding societal change. During this era, philosophers 
such as Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx each contributed to the field in their 
attempts to explain the world around them. At a very basic level, this scientific approach 
is the method described in this thesis. We argue the need to collect data on a designated 
population, to analyze the data, and then deduce what is driving it away from the state, 
and toward rebellion. In understanding the structure and motivations of the population we 
study, and will then attempt to influence that population.   
Durkheim was one of several thinkers to create the concept of “Functionalism,” 
focusing on the structure and workings of a society. Functionalism is the oldest, and still 
the dominant, theoretical perspective in sociology and many other social sciences. This 
perspective is built upon twin emphases: application of the scientific method to the 
objective social world and use of an analogy between the individual organism and society 
(Grinnell, 2008).  This theory will have great importance as we proceed in describing the 
population engagement methodology outlined in this thesis.  
 The next useful theory related to sociology is “Positivism” –a theory derived from 
the studies of early sociologist Auguste Compte. Positivism is the belief that one can 
objectively study humanity utilizing the scientific method, and that this approach will 
minimize personal bias. Others contend that this approach can never remove bias, or that 
a strict scientific method cannot be applied effectively against a dynamic, human  
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organization. While controversial, positivism is a similar approach to our methodology in 
that it stresses the importance of taking an analytical approach, and in maintaining 
objectivity.  
 The last important theory to emerge from sociology is the emphasis on a base 
unit. As physicists attempt to isolate the smallest, baseline element possible, so do 
sociologists, though in different ways. Some sociologists emphasize the individual. Some 
stress the primary group or family. Others still focus on the qualities that make up a 
simple base-line group. Grinell writes, “The second emphasis [the first being 
functionalism], on the organic unity of society, leads functionalists to speculate about 
needs which must be met for a social system to exist, as well as the ways in which social 
institutions satisfy those needs.” (Grinnell, 2008, p. 1). This focus on the “organic” 
societal unit will also emerge as an important point in this thesis. Importantly, our thesis 
argues that the most important unit is the “sub-group”, which is the intersection of 
individual or societal need, and group affiliation. We will describe the idea of sub-group 
later in the next section. 
3. Psychology 
According to the American Psychological Association (APA): 
Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior. The discipline embraces 
all aspects of the human experience — from the functions of the brain to 
the actions of nations, from child development to care for the aged. In 
every conceivable setting from scientific research centers to mental health 
care services, ‘the understanding of behavior’ is the enterprise of 
psychologists” (American Psychological Association, 2008).  
 
With respect to this thesis, the effort toward “the understanding of behavior” is why 
psychology bears importance in our methodology. Though the focus of this thesis is the 
sub-group, collective individual behavioral choices are critically important in counter-
insurgency strategy.  
Topics contemporarily considered psychological in nature were first explored in 
the fields of philosophy and religion. The concept of “soul” and the many variables 
thought to affect human behavior have intrigued humans since time immemorial. 
Following the age of enlightenment, psychology developed around the same time as other 
social sciences in the attempt to specifically isolate and predict cause and effect of human 
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behavior. In the late 19th century, Wilhelm Wundt founded the first psychology 
department at the University of Leipzig, Germany. Van Wagner writes that Wundt 
outlined many of the major connection between the science of physiology and the study 
of human thought and behavior (Van Wagner, 2008). Psychology has since split into 
scores of sub-fields, from clinical research on experimental subjects to understanding 
social behavior broadly.  
Psychologists employ variations of scientific methods to investigate individuals 
and societies, and to confirm or deny generated hypotheses about behavior. Patterns of 
individual behavior analysis and background can be used to predict individual motivation 
and behavior. As will be addressed in later sections, psychology’s importance in 
counterinsurgency is to better understand behavioral motivation. While group influence 
on individual choice is a critical component of societal behavior, choice, ultimately, is an 
individual matter. In a COIN environment, particular individuals, such as Tribal Elders, 
politicians, and charismatic persons can maintain great sway in influencing the 
population around them.  
Psychology is also known for its controversy. Theories such as those of Sigmund 
Freud and Abraham Maslow remain controversial, and have clouded the legitimacy of the 
field for some who view it skeptically. Psychological operations by the military, 
intelligence agencies, and other government entities remain ethically controversial due to 
their real or perceived deceptive nature. This thesis does not endorse or dismiss any 
particular theory, but argues that psychological analysis is an important component of 
overall population analysis. Emotion, trust, and desire, often considered ‘touchy-feely’ 
aspects of human decision-making, can be critical influencers on an individual’s decision 
to aid the state or the insurgent, and is why the field of psychology has been stressed 
here. 
4. Summary of Academic Review 
This section has reviewed three of the most prominent academic fields in the 
study of a population. Though each field promotes a different approach to analyzing a 
designated population, all have relevance in a holistic approach. As operators struggle to 
gather information about the human terrain in their respective area of operation, experts 
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in each field will have important insight and contributions to the picture. We encourage 
operators to consult experts from any of these fields to help shed light onto the population 
they seek to influence.  
B. TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS  
With respect to population analysis, this thesis will focus on two specific aspects: 
individual / societal needs, and group affiliation. The terminology used to describe 
populations from social science, military, and everyday perspectives can make discussion 
confusing. Before continuing discussion of this thesis’s methodology, it is imperative we 
establish a vernacular useful for the rest of the discussion of this thesis, the model, and 
the approach we outline in this thesis. In particular, we will begin by defining the words 
most commonly referenced in this thesis, and relate them to other popularly used 
terminology.  
1.  Dictionary Definitions  
Where applicable, we wish to utilize the most broadly accepted and commonly 
used terminology possible, hence the reason we have included dictionary definitions here. 
Population: The broadest of our definitions, we adopt Merriam-Webster’s 
definition of population 1b as it relates to a defined geographic area or formed human 
organization, “the total of individuals occupying an area or making up a whole” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2008). Specifically, we mean to indicate the total human population 
in a demarcated geographic area, as defined by international bodies, a USG official, a 
military commander, or as understood by the inhabitants. We use the word population to 
simply indicate a geographically based sum of individuals. A population consists of 
individuals who reside, work, or transit a specified or an unspecific geographic region, 
such as a city, valley, neighborhood, or historic lands. In COIN literature, the word 
populace is commonly used synonymously. 
Individual: An individual is one human being; the base element of a population. 
In Social Network Analysis, a related but separate approach from the methodology 
presented here, defines an individual as a “node” (Scott, 2007). 
Group / Sub-group: The overall premise of our methodology is based on 
identifying a population’s sub-groups. We broadly adopt Merriam-Webster’s 2a 
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definition of a group as, “a number of individuals assembled together or having some 
unifying relationship” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). We further define a sub-group as a 
smaller portion of a group that shares common individual and societal needs. A sub-
group, therefore, is a number of individuals within a group, assembled in a smaller group 
having some unifying relationship or common ground. 
Affiliation: Merriam-Webster’s definitions 1a and 1b best define what we mean 
by the term affiliation, “1 a: to bring or receive into close connection as a member or 
branch b: to associate as a member <affiliates herself with the local club>” (Merriam-
Webster, 2008). Here we define affiliation as a voluntary or involuntary membership to a 
recognized or outlined group. 
Need: We also adopt Merriam-Webster’s definitions 2a and 2b of need, as they 
apply well to individuals and populations alike “2 a: a lack of something requisite, 
desirable, or useful b: a physiological or psychological requirement for the well-being of 
an organism” (Merriam Webster, 2008). 
2.  Social Network Analysis  
Though this thesis is not focused on social network analysis (SNA), some SNA 
terminology will be used here, where applicable. Populations are composed of individual 
people, or nodes. Nodes are connected by links, representing a relationship to another 
node. Additionally, each node has particular attributes, or qualities that make it distinct 
from other nodes in the population. Lastly, subgroups, the focus of this thesis, are 
groupings of nodes; each affiliated with other nodes by shared qualities, though not 
necessarily direct relations (Scott, 2007).  
3.  Military 
The U.S. military too, has developed a vernacular for referencing players and 
phenomenon surrounding counter-insurgency theory. According to the most recent 
military manuals regarding counter-insurgency, a vernacular has been developed to 
identify specific players in the insurgency and the population. Similarly, the U.S. Army 
has developed the following vernacular, which we will use here: 
A society can be defined as a population, whose members are subject to 
the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common 
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culture, and share a sense of identity. Here, society can be used 
synonymously with population or populace. 
A group is two or more people regularly interacting on the basis of shared 
expectations of others’ behavior and who have interrelated statuses and 
roles. A social structure includes a variety of groups. These groups may be 
racial, ethnic, religious, or tribal. There may also be other kinship-based 
groups.  
A race is a human group that defines itself or is defined by other groups as 
different by virtue of innate physical characteristics. Biologically, there is 
no such thing as race among human beings; race is a social category.   
An ethnic group is a human community whose learned cultural practices, 
language, history, ancestry, or religion distinguish them from others. 
Members of ethnic groups see themselves as different from other groups 
in a society and are recognized as such by others. Religious groups may be 
subsets of larger ethnic groups. An ethnic group may contain members of 
different religions.  
Tribes are generally defined as autonomous, genealogically structured 
groups in which the rights of individuals are largely determined by their 
ancestry and membership in a particular lineage. Tribes are essentially 
adaptive social networks organized by extended kinship and descent with 
common needs for physical and economic security (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-
33.5, 2006. Section 3-25). 
 
With respect to geographical vernacular, the military again has several key terms:  
The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities 
and bear on the decisions of the commander.  
The area of interest is area of concern to the commander, including the 
area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy 
territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also 
includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the 
accomplishment of the mission (JP 1-02) (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. 
Section 3-25). 
 
 This section reviewed commonly used jargon related to populations to inform the 
reader of the terminology that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. While some 
of the language is common, it is important to establish a base point early before 
discussing more complex issues. The next section will begin the analytical portions of our 
thesis, in breaking down a populace to its base components. 
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C.  BREAKING DOWN A POPULATION: WHAT MAKES IT TICK? 
This section introduces the two major criteria used in our analysis methodology: 
needs/motivation and group affiliation. Humans are universally motivated by the need to 
survive. Of course, survival is relative, as perceived by the individual based on 
psychological, physical, and social needs. It therefore follows that in a counter-
insurgency campaign it is critical to understand the psychological, physical, and social 
needs of the targeted population. 
First and foremost, we tend to our immediate needs such as hunger, resource 
allocation for our families, and strategies to better our situation based on our perception 
of the future. At the micro level, individual desires and decisions matter a great deal. At 
the macro level, however, social desires are not necessarily the sum of aggregated 
individual desires. Social needs / motivation often differ from what an isolated individual 
might express. The importance of identifying a society’s needs / motivations cannot be 
underestimated, for they shape the population’s behavior in determining who will best 
meet those needs, the state or the insurgent. In addition to these desires, group dynamics 
play heavily into group choice, and are the second criteria for our analysis.  
Our second criteria, group affiliation, affects the way we perceive the world, the 
way we interact with the rest of society, and how we gain information. In this section, we 
argue that such needs and group affiliation fall into several important categories, and 
should be the focus of a COIN effort determined to gain and maintain the support of the 
population. In this effort, we attempt to put forth a simple methodology that accounts for 
each of the major influences effecting a designated population. 
1. Needs / Motivation: Why People Do What They Do… 
The first of our two major tools for analysis will be needs / motivation. These 
criteria, which will make up the Y axis of our model, attempt to account for the issues of 
greatest importance to a population, and what drives it to makes it to make decisions, to 
motivate, and to shape action. We often view populations caught in the middle of an 
insurgency as primitive. While some of these societies may, in fact, lack the 
infrastructure and organization deemed requisite by the developed world, we submit that 
overall human needs / motivations are roughly the same globally, though with a cultural 
 35
twist. In order to keep our approach simple and memorable, we have broken needs / 
motivation into three broad categories that we believe account for the general needs of a 
population: Psychological, Infrastructure, and Governance. 
a. Psychological  
Accounting for psychological needs is fuzzy. There are few metrics by 
which we can measure psychological needs. Rather, operators in the field, in enduring 
contact with their designated population will be able, through discussion, observation, 
and cultural awareness, to determine if the emotionally driven needs of the population are 
satiated. We argue that psychological needs are a key component of a population’s 
motivations, and are a vulnerability to be satisfied by either the state, or the insurgent.  
Psychological theory is generally developed to explain behavior at the 
individual level. However, we find these theories useful for categorizing motivation at 
our level of analysis, the subgroup, as well. The following theorists have outlined 
psychological needs they believe explain human behavior. While we do not subscribe 
wholly to either of the theories outlined below, we find them a helpful place for operators 
to begin their assessment of their population’s psychological needs.  
(1) Maslow.  Arguably the most famous psychologist to study 
individual motivation was Abraham Maslow, who developed his “Hierarchy of Needs” in 
1943. In his article, Maslow argues that there is a progressive stepladder of needs that 
must be addressed, more or less, in succession in order to get to a better or “higher” state 
of being. He categorized these needs into the five following groups, “physiological, 














Figure 5.   Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (From Olson, 2008) 
 
 
Physiological needs are the most primitive, and include basic 
health, food, sleep, and other bodily functions. The premise here is that as long as 
individuals have bodily needs, those needs will supersede other needs and motivational 
factors. According to Maslow, therefore, physiological needs are the most important 
needs to address if you wish to enable individuals to focus on other matters.  
Safety needs encompass more social aspects, such as comfort in 
one’s surroundings and security in what Maslow emphasizes as a “…schedule of a kind, 
some sort of routine, something that can be counted upon, not only for the present but 
also far into the future” (Maslow, 1943, p. 377). The theme of a predictable future will 
also re-emerge as we discuss the establishment of trust in later sections. Maslow argues 
that safety needs also lead individuals to seek solace in a religious or philosophical 
doctrine, anything that provides a stable environment. Maslow writes, “The tendency to 
have some religion or world-philosophy that organizes the universe and the men in it into 
some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in part motivated by safety-
seeking” (Maslow, 1943, p. 378). Maslow contends that the need for the feeling of safety 
can be an overriding motivator, putting other interests on the back burner. 
Love is the next higher level in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. 
Maslow writes, “If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified, 
then there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs…” (Maslow, 
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1943, p. 381). This level of need pushes individuals to seek belonging, and a sense that 
others care for them. Such needs are satisfied by family or social organizations in which 
the individual is made to feel a member.  
Esteem needs follow the need for love. Here, beyond belonging, 
individuals seek to fulfill the need to feel important, in their own mind, or in the minds of 
others. Maslow writes, “By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that which is soundly 
based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others” (Maslow, 1943, p. 382). 
Once the lower level needs are satiated, Maslow contends that humans continue to seek 
more that they currently have, in this case a feeling of accomplishment or gratitude from 
internal and external sources.  
Self-Actualization is Maslow’s highest level of need. This desire, 
in Maslow’s hierarchy, manifests itself to give the individual greater meaning. We view 
this need similar to that of a desire to gain fulfillment in an activity or passion. Maslow 
writes, “What a man can be, he must be” (Maslow, 1943, p. 383). This highest level, in 
Maslow’s theory, is most evident in artists, social movement leaders, clergy, or those 
who dedicate themselves passionately to a particular cause.  
We also argue, though not addressed directly in Maslow’s paper 
that desire for fame infamy, or legacy may also fit into several categories. It could be 
argued that the desire to secure one’s place in history is an example of an esteem need. 
One could also argue that such a need could fit into self-actualization, or perhaps above 
the hierarchy outlined by Maslow. Whether as hero or celebrity, the need for fame is a 
powerful motivational force to be considered. 
(2) Reiss. Other contemporary psychologists contend that 
there is not a hierarchy of needs, but that individuals have motivation to satisfy multiple 
desires simultaneously. Steven Reiss suggests that humans have 16 intrinsic motives that 
drive them. Reiss writes, “Motives are reasons people hold for initiating and performing 
voluntary behavior” (Reiss, 2004, p. 179). A USA Today article, written in 2001, 
summarizes Reiss’ research stating: 
 
After conducting studies involving more than 6,000 people, Reiss has 
found that 16 basic desires guide nearly all meaningful behavior: power, 
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independence, curiosity, acceptance, order, saving, honor, idealism, social 
contact, family, status, vengeance, romance, eating, physical exercise, and 
tranquility (USA Today-Reiss, 2001).  
 
Reiss’ theory argues that there are multitudes of motivating factors in an individual’s life, 
but that each person selects among them and prioritizes them differently. According to 
Reiss, some may forgo basic physiological needs such as eating to satiate acceptance, as 
we might find in an anorexic Hollywood actress. The main point in Reiss’ theory is that 
while we are all driven by similar motivating factors, there is no recipe for how those 
factors may play out in any one individual  (Reiss, 2008). 
(3) Academic Debate.  The debate amongst psychologists over 
needs and motivations continues today and is based on various schools of thought, 
experiments, or beliefs regarding the degree to which psychology is nature or nurture or a 
mixture of both. Though he caveats his own hierarchy toward the end of his paper, 
Maslow’s approach postulates that one cannot ascend to higher levels of need until the 
more basic needs are met. He therefore maintains that satiating needs, from a third party 
standpoint, should be prioritized from basic to complex. Reiss, on the other hand, argues 
that there are many (16 to be precise) motivating factors that drive human behavior and 
that different people prioritize them differently (Reiss, 2008). 
This section was designed to aid the operator in his population 
analysis by introducing him to popular theories regarding human motivation. We do not 
advocate any particular theory, but suggest that operators pay most attention to the 
categories put forth by Maslow, Reiss, and other psychologists in the field. That said, in 
developing this methodology, we appreciate Maslow’s hierarchy for its elegance, 
simplicity, and completeness. Those new to psychology will find his five categories a bit 
easier to digest, and less apt to confuse, rather than simplify analysis. We further 
recommend that operators use their cultural knowledge of their population to apply 
psychological analysis as they deem adequate for their specific situation. 
 
b. Infrastructure 
The most obvious needs are those we can see. In our engagement with 
foreign populations, we are quick to identify tangible needs such as unpaved roads or a 
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lack of lights after sunset. In the COIN fight, one of our greatest advantages is our ability 
to bring resources to bear against these needs. Tangible infrastructure development is as 
obvious to a designated population as the lack of infrastructure is to us in the developed 
world, and is, therefore, is a critical part of satiating the needs / motivation of a 
designated population.  
Some aspects of infrastructure are obvious to all. Transportation 
infrastructure such as roads, port systems, and railways are visible to average operators. 
However, more specialized needs, such as bridges, storm water runoff, and general urban 
planning can require additional expertise.  
Power production and electricity are paramount to a developed population. 
Lights extend daylight, enabling extended productivity, and illuminating streets for safety 
and security. Electricity opens doors to new industry, while also allowing for 
development of modern communications resources.  
Health issues can be more difficult to detect. Stagnant water, non-potable 
water, and water delivery systems can be critical for improved infrastructure and to 
satiate infrastructure needs.  
Community service infrastructure should also be analyzed. Community 
centers, hospitals, medical clinics, judicial facilities, law enforcement facilities, education 
facilities, and governance facilities facilitate general governance, which is the topic of the 
next section.  
Infrastructure is an important, but complex issue in COIN. We tend to 
attempt to replicate our own society when engaging developing populations and almost 
immediately begin physical infrastructure projects. They are obvious, tangible, and 
measurable, but they are not everything. Few insurgencies have begun over a lack of 
physical infrastructure, and insurgencies cannot be defeated by physical infrastructure 
alone. Tangible infrastructure is the physical cornerstone of a developed society, but we 
warn the operator to exercise caution in implementation. Not all change is progress. 
Developments in physical infrastructure are not without controversy. An engineering 
assessment that concludes that water should be diverted through a particular 
neighborhood can raise, or resurrect, tribal or ethnic conflicts between local residents. 
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Inadvertent favoritism can be counter-productive. Physical projects, which stand as 
billboards for progress, can also be attacked or destroyed by insurgents, demonstrating a 
lack of control by the state. As a last caution, physical projects can be expensive, time 
consuming, and devour physical and human resources. We therefore include this 
cautionary note when attempting to satiate physical infrastructure needs. It is paramount 
that the implementation of any strategy to satiate needs be executed through, by, and with 
local representatives, and balanced against all other variables.  
c. Governance 
According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), “The concept of "governance" is not new. It is as old 
as human civilization. Simply put "governance" means: the process of decision-making 
and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance 
can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, 
national governance and local governance” (UNESCO, 2008). As societies have 
expanded over time, they have elected or looked to a group of individuals to guide, direct, 
or coordinate them, to allow more fluid interaction within the population. Populations in 
the middle of insurgency often suffer from a lack of governance, in that the existing 
representation or government lacks the knowledge, goals, will, or resources necessary to 
bring about a satisfactorily stable society. A lack of governance in a given population will 
preclude its capacity to satiate the needs of the people, and governance must be 
established if ideas, projects, or development are to be conducted. 
In its advance forms, governance consists of many components with 
which we are all familiar: a legislative body to formulate societal rules, a judicial system 
by which laws can be enforced and disputes adjudicated, an executive branch that 
oversees the government, community health services, education services which provide 
skilled citizens, and others services. We do not mean to imply here that any particular 
form of governance should be replicated, but rather, that operators must recognize and 
consider the local cultural norms and locally acceptable approaches to these issues in 
order to aid the local population in governing themselves.  
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d. P.I.G.: Motivation Made Simple  
The methodology we propose here was developed with the operator in 
mind. The model we developed will enable the operator to better understand the 
population he hopes to influence to his side; in turn, this understanding will assist the 
operator in determining which facets of the population are most vulnerable in the contest 
between the state and the insurgent.  
Each of the above subjects is important. COIN cannot be waged on the 
basis of psychology, infrastructure, or governance alone. Progress in one area will affect 
other areas, perhaps negatively. In this light, we stress the need to approach any 
population holistically. 
In this section, we have summarized the three broad areas in which 
populations have needs, and we have given easily memorized titles to these areas. Thus, 
we can summarize a population’s needs / motivations with the acronym P.I.G., 
representing the broader needs of Psychology, Infrastructure, and Governance. Hence, 
P.I.G. will make up the Y-axis of our analytical model as described in the next chapter. 
2.  Group Affiliation: How People See Themselves Fitting In 
Group affiliation is the second attribute analyzed for population engagement. 
Societies are composed of groups of people. Group identity can be based on a plethora of 
qualities. For example, Dennis O’Neil offers the following as categories for group 
identification: age or rite of passage, gender, vocation (job/skill set), avocation (hobby), 
common residence or geographical affiliation, religious belief, political ideology or past 
experience (2008). These categories are not all-inclusive, but account for a good starting 
point in the identification of groups in a given population.  
However, no one group is homogenous. Each group contains members with 
different individual needs and motives, as discussed previously. As population analysis is 
discussed, it is important to note that a node, or individual, may belong to multiple 
groups, and have multiple needs. The key to this analysis is not to cater a strategy for a 
specific person, but to address all the cross sections to ensure that the state, not the 
insurgent is meeting the needs of all cross sections identified. This processed will be 
further fleshed out in Chapter V, The Model in Practice. 
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3. Why Group Identity Matters 
Group identity is critical in understanding how individuals in a targeted 
population see themselves in relation to the rest of the population, how they receive 
information, and whom they must go through to receive material, financial, social, or 
psychological support. Individuals can belong to one or more groups, and may have 
stronger affiliation to one than another. Consequently, it is important to ensure each 
group is addressed as part of a cross-group strategy, or individually, as required.  
a.  Insulation 
“Cohesion” is the glue that holds society together, and group affiliations 
are an important component of cohesion. Group affiliations are comprised of sets of 
subgroups commonly linked by one of the group dynamics discussed previously. A state 
attempts to influence every subgroup in a population, it must consider the 
communications channels internal and external to each group. Some communications, 
services, and influences can be cast across all groups. In other cases, insulated groups can 
only be reached through leadership, who control the flow of information and resources to 
the rest of the group. As an example, if the state wishes to address the food needs of a 
very insulated Tribe, it may have to work through the Tribal leader to reach those in need.   
Group identity and insulation of a group can lead to false impressions about a 
population. Groups that are less insular, or who have outgoing leadership may be easier 
to access, leading to the impression that the whole population is being accessed. Such 
interaction can conceal groups that are not being accessed due to their position in the 
population. The operator must be cognizant not to just interact with the first group to 
approach his truck, or to extend a handshake. Failure to dig more deeply into group 
affiliation may lead to the operator unintentionally favoring a particular slice of the 
population, and may prove counter-productive.  
b.  Groupthink 
Groupthink is an important concept to consider when analyzing groups. 
Insulation from other groups and limited communications networks can lead to the 
reinforcement of ideas, regardless of the reality of such ideas. Stereotypes, prejudice, 
bigotry and a warped sense of fairness can be reinforced in an insulated group, leading to 
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starker differences with other groups, and further isolation. Marc Sageman highlights this 
concept at a micro level with analysis of terror cell sub-groups in his book Understanding 
Terror Networks (Sageman, 2004). Groupthink plays an even greater role in a stateless 
situation in which there is no nationalism. A lack of national pride places even more 
emphasis on the role of smaller groups and increases the influence of groupthink.  
c. Leadership: Are Group Members Accessible, or is there a Leader 
in the Way? 
Leadership matters, particularly in insulated groups. Some groups are 
open to influence from the rest of society as are most groups in the United States today. 
Some groups, however, are less open to outside influence, and can only be accessed 
through their recognized leaders. As an extreme example, consider a religiously 
fundamentalist group. In an effort to maintain their norms and values, they may isolate 
themselves from the rest of the population, requiring outside influence to be filtered 
through designated representatives. As we continue to discuss population engagement 
analysis, it should become clearer that not only are group affiliations defining, but they 
also determine the method by which the group can be reached. 
d.  Population Summary 
This section introduced the academic fields, terminology, and our two 
criteria for analysis of a population. The purpose of this section was to introduce the 
operator to the qualities of a population, its needs, and its group dynamics. These facets 
will enable the operator to identify the subgroups in his population based on their specific 
societal needs and accessibility. The key to our method is not to tailor solutions for 
individuals, but to address the needs of each subgroup.  
The next section will introduce the model we have developed to aid the 
operator in better seeing his designated population. In the model there is a place for each 
of the population characteristics outlined above. Our purpose in introducing the complex 
dynamics of population analysis it to introduce the operator to the minefield of 
complexity they may face in engaging a population. We hope our model enables the 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 45
IV. THE MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL  
The preceding chapters introduced counterinsurgency theory, and the many 
academic fields that deal with analysis of a population. This chapter will introduce a 
model designed to aid the operator in the analysis of a given population based on group 
affiliation and needs/motivation. The model serves as a lens through which the operator 
can better see his assigned populace. The end state of our methodology is the 
identification of “subgroups” in a population, and their needs and vulnerabilities. This 
will allow the operator to meet the needs of the most vulnerable in a population, building 
trust and support with these subgroups and beating the insurgents in their battle for the 
population  
If you recall from the counter-insurgency chapter, “the population is the prize” 
(McCormick, 2007). It follows that is the fight is over the population, we can consider the 
population analogous to a checkerboard, each square in play, and vulnerable to both the 
insurgent and the state. In this analogy, each square on the checkerboard is occupied by a 
subgroup of the population, and is up for grabs with respect to support. Our model was 
created to allow the operator to discern these subgroups within a given population so that 
strategies may be formed to ‘win” each one. We name our model the 3 x 5 or “PIG 
SPEER” model to reflect the general dimensions outlined in the previous chapter: three 
needs / motivation categories; five group affiliation categories. If you remember nothing 
else from this thesis, we encourage you to remember the acronyms we have developed to 
aid the operator in keeping this analysis in the front of his mind: “PIG SPEER.” Our 
acronym is not meant to be sarcastic or meant imply that we take this endeavor lightly; 
but is meant to be memorable in the minds of operators who are already inundated with 
lists of acronyms pertaining to their daily duties.   
1. Purpose of the Model: How We See the Model Fitting into COIN 
Strategy  
First and foremost, the 3 x 5 model is an analytical heuristic tool designed to 
allow operators to better view their designated population. When developed for a 
particular population, the 3 x 5 model enables planners to determine a population’s 
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critical needs, and further determine if we and the state, are meeting ensuring those 
needs, or if insurgents have filled the void.  
Second, the model serves as a synchronization tool for planners and operators. 
Ultimately, as a visual tool and common ground for discussion, we intend the 3 x 5 model 
to facilitate interagency, international, and interdisciplinary synchronization of effort. 
Last, the 3 x 5 model outlines categories that may be used as the basis of 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs). We argue that the subgroups identified in the course 
of this analysis may be individually analyzed to determine the portions of the population 
supporting the state, and those supporting the insurgent.  
2. The Vertical Columns: Group Affiliation 
Figure 5 represents the group affiliations identified in the last chapter. In a real-
world population, there may be several or several dozen groups identified. Here, the 
vertical columns in the 3 x 5 PIG SPEER model account for group affiliations found in 
the example population. In the example below we have only accounted for the five 
general group affiliation categories identified in the previous chapter.  
 
Figure 6.   Group Affiliation 
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3.  The Horizontal Rungs: Needs / Motivation 
Figures 6 represents the general, broad categories for a population’s needs and 
motivations. Here the categories are represented as horizontal rungs that stretch across a 
designated population. The three general categories illustrated here are the broad 
categories we have developed for easy recall. In a real-world case, there may be scores of 
identified individual and societal needs within a population. 
 
Figure 7.   Needs / Motivation 
 
4.  Subgroups Revealed: The “3 x 5 PIG SPEER” Model 
Once cross-meshed, the intersections of Needs / Groups reveals “Sub-Groups,” 
the focus of this methodology. In Figure 8 below, “PIG SPEER” or 3 x 5 Model is 
illustrated to show the cross-section of needs / motivations and group affiliations. Here 
the circle highlights a specific subgroup, with the same infrastructure need and 








Figure 8.    Group Affiliation &Needs / Motivation  
 
5.  What the Model Is… and Isn’t 
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the methodology and model presented 
in this thesis are designed to aid the operator in better viewing his target population. The 
model is intended to be an analytical tool, a synchronization tool, and a basis for creating 
measures of effectiveness. The end state of this methodology is a better understanding of 
the conflict, a point of discussion with other organizations in the area of operation, and a 
starting point for review of success. 
What the model is not, is a strategy for “how to win” sub-groups. Once identified, 
the types of power and resources available to the operator discussed in chapter six will 
assist the operator in course of action development, but will not determine a best strategy 
for engaging specific populations. Each solution will depend upon the characteristics of 
the subgroup, the persons within it, and the discrete point in time. Nor is this model static. 
It will have to be updated constantly as more is learned of the targeted population, as the 
environment changes, and as progress is made. The next chapter will outline the basics in 
utilizing the model, and address the long process of getting to know your designated 
population. 
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V. THE MODEL IN PRACTICE 
Population Engagement Strategy is an ongoing process. In conventional warfare, 
enough resources can overcome even somewhat flawed initial plans and lack of 
information. Counter-insurgency and population engagement strategy, on the other hand, 
are dynamic endeavors. They can go on for years, and necessitate a constant stream of the 
most up-to-date information for the COIN force to adapt as the environment morphs.   
The purpose of this chapter is to outline our intended use of the model. In this 
effort, we hope to give the operator a clearer picture of how this heuristic 3 x 5 
PIGSPEER tool is a valuable for revealing the dynamics of his populace, and how it will 
facilitate strategy for “winning over” the population, one sub-group at a time. The key to 
this analysis is not to cater a strategy for any specific person, but to reveal each subgroup. 
Once revealed, the state can then develop strategies for each subgroup to ensure that the 
state, not the insurgent, is meeting the needs of the population. The following sections 
will outline the use of the 3 x 5 “PIG SPEER” model. The end result is the revelation of 
the population’s subgroups. 
A.  IDENTIFYING GROUPS 
 Our analysis begins with knowledge of the groups within the population. This 
knowledge will allow the state or allied power to determine access points to subgroups, 
and to develop strategies for engaging each. The process of group identification should 
begin prior to entering a population’s geographic environment; the more that is known of 
the environment before interaction the better. Information obtained on the ground will 
confirm or repudiate previous belief, and aid in better inquiry with the designated 
population.  
 Perhaps the most useful information regarding groups within a designated 
population will come from operator interaction with groups themselves. Local 
demographics may not be readily appreciated in the study of official records, books or 
journals. For example, a split within a tribe or family may have created two distinct 
groups previously under one group heading, leading to two similar, but separate groups. 
This is information most likely gained from interacting directly with the population.  
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The group categories presented in chapters three and four are: Social, Political, 
Employment, Ethnic, and Religious. However, these categories are designed only to 
stimulate group recognition, not to box subgroups into one specific category. Most 
individuals will fall into numerous groups. Again, this method is not tailor-made to the 
individual, but to the subgroup. If for example, all the wood-gatherers in a designated 
Afghan population are Tajik, two groups have been identified: wood-gatherers and 
Tajiks. The wood-gatherers will have certain needs, as will the Tajiks as a whole. These 
details will be worked out in time. Just get to know the groups in the area. Start broadly, 
and refine as time allows.  
As groups are identified, the operator should catalog each group into a detailed 
list. The list compiled will become the categories for the X-axis of the PIG SPEER 
model. As more groups are identified, the model can be modified. To see an illustration 
of this process see Figure X:  Ramadi Subgroups and Needs.     
B. IDENTIFYING NEEDS / MOTIVATION 
1.  General Process 
Needs and motivation is the second portion of our analysis. Determining a 
population’s needs is difficult, and will take time to assess accurately. We also caution 
the operator from imposing his own desires onto the perceived needs of the population, as 
they may not, in fact, reflect the common desires of the population.  
Needs and motivation are discovered in many ways: some through dialogue, 
observation, and demands made by the population itself. The process of identifying 
groups alone will place the state or operator in contact with the people and their needs. 
Therefore, when working to identify subgroups, simultaneously pay attention to needs 
and motivations.  
Other needs will be discovered through analysis. Regardless of the technique, or 
the type of need, the objective here is to determine the population’s own perceived needs. 
Referencing Chapters III and IV, will aid in the process. The broad categories developed 
to aid the operator were: Psychological, Infrastructure, and Governance. Again, the 
categories themselves are not important. They are merely used to jog memory.  
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Analysis has an additional function. Particularly in developing countries, states 
and foreigners will be asked for many things. Some of these things will be easier to 
address or deliver than others. Some are simply indicators or symptoms of other, deeper 
problems. Care must be taken not only to catalog grievances, but to attempt to find 
solutions that are more permanent than superficial.  
2.  Putting Needs / Motivation into the Model 
As needs and motivations are identified, they should be cataloged into a 
consolidated list for the community. Needs identified for one group may have 
implications for the entire population, and are listed on the Y-axis. The needs for a small 
group of people may indicate needs across a population. Other needs are more specific to 
a particular group, and may not hold true for other groups. Prioritizing needs will require 
careful analysis, and should be accomplished through, by and with the local community.  
C. SUBROUPS: THE TARGET OF CARROTS AND STICKS 
1.  Subgroups Revealed 
No one group is homogenous. Each group contains members with different needs 
and motivations, forming smaller subgroups. Following analysis of group affiliations and 
needs / motivations, subgroups will begin to reveal themselves. The cross sections of 
needs/motivation and group affiliation represent subgroups, the focus of this 
methodology. Subgroups share the same identity and needs.  
2.  Prioritizing Subgroup Vulnerability 
The next step in our method is to conduct subgroup analysis. As we have created 
a checkerboard of subgroups, each of varying needs and size, we must now determine 
which subgroups are most vulnerable to the insurgent, as they will command the most 
immediate attention. Subgroup analysis will also allow us to identify subgroups that do 
not require much attention. For example, if the need for electricity is identified for the 
population, but the wood-gatherers do not have electricity as a critical need, that 
subgroup may not need to be addressed on this specific issue. In this methodology we do  
not propose any particular prioritization of effort or hierarchy based on needs /  
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motivation or group affiliation. Every scenario will require analysis to determine which 
subgroups require the most immediate attention based on overall objectives and resources 
available. 
3.  Synchronization of All Efforts  
 Prioritizing a designated population’s subgroups enables the state to focus effort 
and to strategize to meet each subgroup’s needs based on vulnerability to insurgents. This 
method also allows efforts to be synchronized. This thesis does not address specifics of 
synchronization, as synchronization varies dramatically from place to place. Nor does it 
address specifically how to meet these needs, only what the needs are and which 
subgroups have them. In synchronizing efforts, we simply mean to imply that the PIG 
SPEER model can be a starting point for communication, coordination, and 
synchronization of effort. For example, if healthcare is identified as a critical need, and 
Doctors Without Borders and the International Red Cross are working diligently to 
address the need, the state or operator may direct attention to other needs. For political 
and pragmatic reasons, domestic and international agencies in the area may not wish to 
coordinate efforts. Though unfortunate, information regarding each agency’s efforts helps 
facilitate the prioritization of effort given existing efforts in the region. 
D. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION IN RAMADI 
The figure below is an illustration of how a tactical level soldier in Ramadi might 
have developed his understanding of the environment using the model. As the operator 
gathers information to enter into the methodology he may see trends.  Trends of needs 
might be logical places to start because they maximize their effectiveness across a 
broader range of people.  The subgroups and their needs are fictitious, shown here only 



































































































As can be seen above groups are easily identified.  In the figure above an example 
of a social group is a soccer team or league and their needs might be security, a field to 
play on, and a level of confidence that allows them to play and not worry about being 
caught in the crossfire of security operations.  They may also need soccer balls, jerseys, 
and soccer nets. 
An example of a political subgroup might be ex-Bathists.  They might be feeling 
neglected by the new government and need representation and a sense of inclusion.   
An example of an ethnic subgroup might be the Albu Soda tribe.  They might 
need security of their tribe to ensure their lands are not used as an insurgent safe-haven. 
They might also need cell phone towers, gasoline, IED free streets to enable their 
economy to re-emerge, and a sense of inclusion in the local government.    
Often times the operator may identify multiple subgroups of one kind of group: as 
can be seen with doctors and taxi drivers in the employment group. Again, just in this 
brief description of what an operator might have learned about his environment there are 
commonalities of needs between subgroups.  Depending upon what the operator thinks he 
can affect, these trends may be the ideal place to initially focus their efforts of 
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engagement.  To better explain how these subgroups and their needs can be leveraged the 
following is an in-depth discussion of three of these subgroups. 
Doctors and taxi drivers are examples of employment subgroups.  Doctors might 
need security at their hospitals, and modern technological resources to help them provide 
better healthcare, a sense that they are making a difference.  Taxi drivers might need 
secure roads, access to fuel, and cell phone towers to better enable their business.  A 
mosque, its leadership, and its constituency is an example of a religious subgroup.  They 
might need security, repairs, and an apology from the security forces that damaged their 
property.     
Taxi drivers are an example of an employment subgroup.  An operator might 
observe rows of unemployed taxi drivers are a common sight and that the drivers park in 
a line and sit on their hoods smoking and carrying on conversation with one another; their 
social interaction might yield volumes of valuable information.  Hypothetically, in 
Ramadi the taxi drivers’ needs were overall security to include IED free streets, cell 
towers so that they could be called into service, and fuel for their vehicles.  Why engage 
taxi drivers?  Taxi drivers know who comes and goes.  They sit around all day and 
observe their environment.  They could be an excellent source of information.  Imagine if 
CF were able to secure the roads or at least major arteries, allow taxis to operate on them 
under local supervision, open secure fuel centers not subject to corruption and smuggling, 
and introduce cell towers and cell phones to energize their business.  More than likely 
they would be heavily employed, in favor of the local security forces, and a wealth of on-
going information.  Obviously, taxi drivers are not the only subgroups that would benefit 
from these actions. Freedom of movement for the greater populace would instill 
confidence in their security forces and could potentially energize the economy.  
Another example of an employment group is doctors.  In Ramadi, hospitals were 
poorly equipped and often over crowded.  Hypothetically, let us assume they lacked 
modern technologies such as sterilization equipment, X-ray machines, and ultra-sound 
machines.  Additionally, there was no security at the hospitals to stop insurgents from 
using them as safe-havens, as well as disrupting operations, and intimidating patients.  
Why should we engage doctors?  Local doctors were often obligated to work on injured 
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insurgents.  Therefore, they could be a resource for information.  Possibly timely 
intelligence on when insurgents arrive, who and how many are injured, and where they 
go after being treated.  Additionally, there is always a need for health care, and often 
people can’t get to a hospital or can’t pay for services.  By providing the needs of the 
doctors, the doctors will be able to provide better healthcare, feel emboldened by their 
ability to help, and possibly support the local security forces.  They might become willing 
to share information with the security forces and even agree to export their services to the 
greater populace through Civil Affairs operations.  Providing security to the hospital 
denies insurgents a safe-haven, professional medical assistance, and an opportunity to 
intimidate the locals.  This further diminishes the insurgent’s ability to operate in the 
environment and may lead to more detentions or capitulations.   
Doctors are not the only ones to benefit from an increase in security and civic 
action.  The population as a whole will get better health care and it will be more available 
to the masses.  People will no longer be afraid to go to the hospital and they will have the 
security forces to thank. Additionally, the affects of engagement with the taxi drivers will 
also benefit the doctors in that people will better more reliable transportation to the 
hospitals with an increase in the taxi drivers’ business.  It is our belief that security will 
have one of the greatest overall affects on the environment. 
 An example of a religious subgroup might be a specific mosque in the 
neighborhood of where the soldier using the methodology is working.  Mosques have 
often been used as safe-havens and planning centers, and their loud speakers have been 
used to coordinate operations.  In Ramadi, it was illegal for U.S. forces to enter or engage 
a mosque without a dire need and high-level approval.  In searches, mosques were often 
damaged.  This enraged the local populace, and provided fuel for the insurgent’s rhetoric.  
Hypothetically speaking again, let’s assume that a specific mosque needs new 
speakers for their call to prayer and damage to their property repaired.  Why should 
security forces help a mosque that supports the insurgency?  It might be that the 
leadership of the mosque is being strong armed to support the insurgency and they might 
be willing to denounce the insurgency if security forces can provide adequate protection.  
By attempting to make right the wrongs that have been committed against the mosque, 
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security forces might gain favor from the mosque’s leadership and the local populace.  It 
might be as simple as fixing their loud speakers, repairing doors, windows, or anything 
else that might have been damaged in the search for insurgents. Since U.S. service men 
are not allowed to enter mosques unless in distress, the repairs would have to be 
contracted through a local source: helping re-energize the local economy.  Making right 
the wrong might also require a public apology.  All these things are worth the effort if 
they gain the support of the leadership of the mosque and the local populace.  Ultimately 
these actions may lead to a better standing with the local population and an increase in 
the flow of information to security forces.  If actions taken are truly successful then the 
loud speakers might be used to publicly denounce the insurgency. 
Again, these examples are purely hypothetical and should not be construed as a 
list of best practices or likely groups to engage in any environment.  They are to show 
how the methodology might be built and utilized.  Hopefully, this reference back to 
Ramadi shows the relevance of the methodology and its ability to focus efforts and 
maximize results.   
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VI. GETTING STARTED: WORKING TO “WIN” SUBGROUPS 
The intent of this chapter is to provide a starting point for the operator. Again, this 
thesis is not designed to develop solutions to any given conflict, but to educate the state 
or operator to better view his or her population. We will now discuss the basic 
approaches and resources at his disposal. In the discussion below, this chapter will lay out 
the concept of trust as the key to engaging a population. It will then frame the different 
kinds of power held by the state to better inform planners to the approaches available to 
them. Last, this chapter will outline the Elements of National Power available to the state 
and operator alike. 
A. GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR POPULATION  
1.  Sources of Information  
a.  Pre-Deployment Preparation  
The state or international third party should begin education as soon as 
they are on notice that they will have responsibility for conducting a COIN campaign. 
General information on most populations is now readily available via many sources. The 
internet has opened an overwhelming number of official and unofficial sites with 
information from government, non-government, commercial, and private sources. Most 
government organizations have intelligence personnel whose job is to maintain reporting 
on specific areas of interest, and who can customize information for a particular purpose. 
Most important in this effort is the synthesis of multiple sources of reporting to best 
illuminate the designated population. 
 b.  Open Sources 
The Internet has revolutionized our ability to obtain information. Filtering 
the overwhelming amount of data can be challenging. Internet search engines such as 
Google or Dogpile and government resources such as the CIA World Factbook and 
Department of State Travel Warnings websites are great tools for revealing information 
on your particular population, and allow tailored searches for specific inquiries.  
Equally abundant are new and old books relaying stories and information 
from every corner of the globe. Travel book series such as Lonely Planet, Let’s Go, and 
 58
Fodor’s offer cultural insights and information useful for navigating foreign geography. 
A book series of particular value to the authors has been the CULTURE SHOCK series by 
Graphic Arts Publishing, which offers a detailed, culturally focused account of many 
foreign locales through a western lens. In addition to the internet and books, local 
newspapers, periodicals such as National Geographic and movies can be very helpful in 
revealing local culture.  
 c.  HUMINT 
Once on the ground, the operator will encounter a plethora of sources. 
Some will prove more reliable than others, some will only seek benefit in their relation 
with the operator, and some will not be able to succinctly articulate their group or needs. 
Nevertheless, real time local human sources will be the operator’s best source of 
information.  
Securing human sources is paramount. Though a human source may be 
comfortable enough to engage in dialogue with the state or the operator, he puts himself 
in great danger by siding against the insurgent. All efforts to secure a human source must 
be taken very seriously, even if the environment appears to facilitate interaction. A source 
whose personal or familial safety has been compromised will dry up as an information 
resource, and may encourage others to shy away from divulging information as well. The 
insurgent has great incentive to silence popular support for the state, and uses coercion 
and violence to that end. Operators should seek HUMINT expertise in even the most 
benign circumstances to preserve relations with locals who have risked everything to aid 
the state.   
 d.  The U.S. Army Human Terrain System (HTS) 
The U.S. HTS was discussed in Chapter III. The program is now quite 
robust and has over twenty-six Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) spread across U.S. Army 
Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Teams in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Deeper resources and data centers reside in the U.S. Intelligence 
professionals and analysts who can access HTS resources and have the ability to ask 
specific questions of their designated population. HTS is another valuable resource for 
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understanding the cultural lens through which your population has organized itself with 
respect to group affiliation, and understanding the values which drive needs / motivation. 
 e.  Peers 
Peers are an obvious resource, but are seldom utilized to their full 
potential. Within any region of the world are experts, who have extensive experience 
with specific populations. Within academia, for example, reside post-doctoral candidates 
who have formed their dissertation around your designated population. Many have 
published their research, or may be contacted for further information.  
Relief in Place or Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) provides another 
venue to question peers regarding a designated population. We believe our 3 x 5 model is 
an excellent tool for RIP/TOA as it provides a common operating picture (COP) for new 
and old organizations to discuss the social dynamics, leaders, and stakeholders within the 
population. A picture is worth a thousand words. 
B.  TRUST  
Trust is the foundation for influencing a subgroup. For the state to effectively 
sway a population to the point at which they are willing to aid the state against the 
insurgents, perhaps putting themselves in danger in the process, the state must assert 
itself as the legitimate path to a better future. Therefore, the most important relationship 
for the state to establish is trust. Merriam-Webster defines trust as, “dependence on 
something future or contingent” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). Trust, typically considered a 
positive term, is the best means through which the state can hope to establish a 
relationship with the population. This is not to imply that the state must befriend each 
individual or node. When establishing trust is not possible, the state must, at the very 
least prove to the population that it is consistent and equitable in order to bolster its 
legitimacy. Reliance upon the state to predictably execute future action substitutes for a 
trusting relationship.  
Piotr Sztompka states that, “Intuitively we feel that trust must be vested in people, 




emphasizes that social phenomena are the proper domain for trust (Sztompka, 1999, p. 
19). Thus, it is paramount for the population to view the state as a group of reliable 
people in whom they can trust their futures. If previously damaged, re-establishing this 
relationship will take time.  
There are several basic ways that trust can be established. For example, 
infrastructure projects promised by state officials must be completed as promised, on 
time and with the capabilities expected. Equality in education, suffrage, and social 
welfare must be perceived as reasonable expectations by each subgroup throughout a 
community.   Szompka writes, “All social interaction is an endless process of acting upon 
expectations, which are part cognitive, part emotional, and part moral” (Sztompka, 1999). 
Regardless of the subgroup being targeted, the critical component of the establishment of 
trust in the state is managing expectations. Subgroups that feel they know what to expect 
from the state can put their faith in it. As such, individuals can bet their lives with the 
state, deciding to aid, rather than remain neutral, or worse, support the insurgent.  
The word trust has positive connotations, and a positive relationship should be 
built whenever possible. However, where not possible, predictability must suffice. The 
state must endeavor to allow each subgroup to feel they will follow through as promised, 
whether positively or negatively.  
C.  TYPES OF POWER  
The preceding section stated that managing expectations was a key to earning the 
trust of the population. This next section will focus on power techniques useful in 
influencing subgroups. Contemporary academics have written extensively on the 
application of power with respect to managing people, organizations, markets, and 
populations. Philosophers and authors such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jeffery Pfeffer, 
Bertram Raven, and John French have each laid out models by which power, and its 
implementation can be better understood. This paper will focus on French’s and Raven’s 
“Bases of Power” model for the engagement of subgroups in a targeted population. This 
thesis focuses on the state’s application of power to win a population from insurgents, 
and does not address the insurgent’s use of power, which may be similar. 
 61
1. French and Raven - Outlining the Types of Power Available to the 
State 
Population engagement strategy must address the underlying or root causes of 
grievances with the state, as they are the leverage of the insurgent. This can only be done 
by establishing dialogue with the population in order to determine both individual and 
group dynamics and motivational factors. Upon the completion of the analysis of the 
designated population, a strategy must be developed to engage each discovered subgroup. 
Techniques designed for influencing one subgroup may not work for another. 
Additionally, several techniques may be employed simultaneously against one subgroup. 
The following paragraphs explore five social powers, defined by sociologists French and 
Raven, which are useful frameworks for the state in developing techniques for engaging 
population subgroups. Last, this chapter will outline the elements of national power, 
which provide a comprehensive list of the types of resources available to the state or 
operator.  
In 1959, French and Raven published a study revealing five different types of 
power, each with a specific relationship between powerbroker and audience in mind. 
While the original study was designed to describe relations within a society at large, the 
bases of power laid out here provide a useful framework for describing the powers held 
by the state over a targeted population. In return, for the use of this power, the state seeks 
compliance. The bases of power are: Legitimate Power, Referent Power, Expert Power, 
Reward Power, and Coercive Power (Raven and French, 1959). 
a. Coercive Power – Potential to Take Away 
Coercive power is the use of negative influence, and is the opposite of 
reward power. In this kind of power, the individual or group has leverage over other 
individuals or groups, and the ability to impose punitive action or to deny positive 
reward. Common applications of coercive power are overt threat, physical suffering, 
blackmail, or the loss of freedoms or prestige. While effective in providing a population 
the incentive to act in a certain manner, coercive power must be used sparingly. In the 
long term, coercive power will only last as long as the powerbroker is in position to 
maintain negative consequences. Afterwards, those who were coerced will not continue 
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to be influenced by their former oppressor, and may in fact turn against them. Examples 
of those who hold coercive power are insurgents who threaten retaliatory action for 
compliance with the state, criminal organizations who threaten citizenry with physical 
harm should they go to the state, states who maintain the ability to detain citizens, block 
roadways, or deny access to services or aid. While effective in the short term, the long 
term effect of using coercive power is contempt for the state, and should therefore be 
used sparingly. 
b. Legitimate Power – Recognized Power; the Goal of the State  
Arguably, the most important type of power in an insurgency / counter-
insurgency contest is legitimate power. Legitimate power, as the name suggests, is 
derived by the position held by the individual or group. Official or perceived positions 
within a society wield formal authority typically delegated by the state, or formal 
organizations. The accepted responsibilities and resources held by such persons or groups 
entitle them to privileged and therefore powerful positions within a society. Common 
examples of individuals and groups who hold legitimate power are politicians, police, and 
other easily identifiable officials. 
c. Expert Power – Skill and Knowledge 
Expert power, as the name suggests, is derived from the possession of 
specific, desired knowledge or skills. Expert power is held by engineers, doctors, 
technicians, literate individuals, clerics anointed to interpret God’s will, politicians with 
greater access to information than the public, or educated individuals who have a broader 
knowledge-base and a better than average ability to make an argument. Expert power is 
maintained as long as others cannot obtain special skills.  
d. Reward Power – The Potential to Give 
Reward power is, simply put, held by those with the ability to assign 
positive benefit to others. As such they are also able to maintain the attention of those 
without. Rewards take the form of money, promotion, perks, recognition, and extended 
freedoms. While humans are susceptible to reward power, there is a danger in its 
application. Rewards given too freely can become the standard, not the exception, leading 
to a reduction in effectiveness. Rewards distributed unevenly or erratically can cause the 
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powerbroker to lose influence over others. The most common powerbrokers who wield 
reward power are managers, bosses, and those with possession of scarce resources. With 
respect to rewards held by the state, most often, these come in the form of provision of 
social services aimed at basic needs. While Raven and French focus mainly on the 
expectation of reward, in this practice, it is likely the expectation based on demonstrated 
action that matters. Raven  and French write, “The utilization of actual rewards (instead 
of promises) by O [the state] will tend over time to increase the attraction of P [the 
populace] toward O and therefore the referent power of O over P” (Raven and French, 
1959, p. 156). 
e. Referent Power – Charismatic Influence 
Referent Power is the most difficult for state entities to replicate for it is a 
natural phenomenon held by those whose charisma and personality charm others to them. 
These natural leaders often develop subgroups around themselves, perhaps 
unintentionally. The number of individuals, or nodes, who wish to maintain relations with 
this powerful individual, can be very high, often becoming loyal followers- even if the 
individual does not necessarily seek the authority position. 
French and Raven’s “Bases of Power” provide the state with five different 
approaches to each subgroup. The type and of power best suited for the state’s interaction 
with the subgroup will depend on the specific qualities of the subgroup, objectives, and 
resources available. Over time, a variety of approaches may be necessary, and if one base 
of power proves unsuccessful, another may be substituted. Our purpose in outlining the 
bases of power is to remind the state of its array of options.  (Raven and French, 1959, p. 
156). 
D. M.I.D.L.I.F.E: THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER 
1. M.I.D.L.I.F.E. 
The elements of national power are those assets available to a state for engaging 
both domestic and foreign populations. The traditional acronym for the elements of 
national power was DIME: Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and Economic. They have 
now been expanded to more specifically account for their unique qualities, utilizing the 
acronym MIDLIFE: Military, Informational, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, 
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Financial and Economic (Wendt, 2005). We have included the elements of national 
power as useful reminders of the types of resources available to the operator as he or she 
develops strategy for each identified subgroup. 
a. Military  
Military resources include all of the Department of Defense or Ministry of 
Defense assets. Typically, military power is utilized to physically force or coerce an 
opponent to their will, but also has more altruistic components such as Civil Affairs or 
the Medical Corps. 
b. Information 
  Information includes all assets the state maintains to put out information. 
This includes radio, print media, television, internet, and public addresses. In COIN, 
crafting messages is a critical component to providing overall governance. 
c. Diplomacy 
  Diplomacy is dialogue. It is based on the premise that issues can be 
discussed and resolved by agreement between parties. Often times, a COIN environment 
lacks a proper venue for the expression of needs. 
d. Law Enforcement  
  Law enforcement includes the components of basic judicial systems, 
including legal counsel, lawyers, judges, police, and legislative counsel. Police are often 
the furthest extension of governance, and symbolize the level of security present in the 
population. 
e. Intelligence 
  The Intelligence Community (IC) is comprised of the military and civilian 
agencies that collect, analyze, and disseminate information. The IC has many resources 
for gathering information in a subtle manner, and can field specific questions of a 
designated population. 
f. Finance 
  Finance is a powerful form of reward power, and a catalyst for many 
endeavors. States maintain funding for many functions, many of which may aid the 
operator in providing for the needs in his population. 
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g. Economic 
  Economic power is the ability to assess, invigorate, and regulate a 
population’s economy. States have multiple ministries, departments, and agencies 
dedicated to ensuring a robust economy. A strong economy is a solid platform upon 
which a stable society can be built. 
E. POWER AND THE STATE: HYPOTHETICALS 
Though originally intended to outline powers held within society, the kinds of 
power, and resources available discussed in the previous sections frame the approaches 
available to the state for use in engaging the targeted population. In order to gain control 
of the targeted population, a combination of the above types of power must be applied to 
convince the population to change behavior in order to aid the state in identifying the 
insurgents. Additionally, it is important to identify what type of power leaders possess in 
order to know how to affect, motivate, or coerce them.  This process can take place 
across multiple subgroups simultaneously, or in any manner deemed prudent for the 
overall strategy. Below, we will discuss the application of power to influence the 
hypothetical needs, outlined below.  
1. The Application of Power to Hypothetical Needs 
Status. Status is defined by Stephen Reiss as, “Desire for social standing 
(including desire for attention)” (Reiss, 2004). Insurgent ranks are filled by many people, 
some of whom seek status. As such, the state must satiate this need through legitimate 
means. However, status is not necessarily a matter of hierarchy within a group. Status is 
desired by many within each group, and the “higher” status levels may not be the most 
important. Here, legitimate power and reward power can be leveraged to offer official 
status to the portion of the population that seeks it. Positions within the state are one 
solution. Venues in which individuals can be recognized by the state to voice grievances 
are another. Allowing those who seek status to have a channel through the state can pull 
those segments of the community toward it. Referent power will aid to affect those in this 
category. Leading by example, or enabling individuals in this category to seek the same 
referent power may encourage them to seek legitimate, versus insurgent positions to 
satiate their desires. True ideologues may not be easily swayed, for the status they seek is 
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insatiable. In such circumstances, coercion power may be helpful in influencing these 
people because of their vulnerability to stay on course to pursue their selfish desires. 
Coercive power can be used in cases where the state has the ability to prevent the 
individual from achieving their goals.  Legitimate, reward, and coercion power are used 
together here in exchange for compliance.  
Employment. Our next hypothetical need is employment. State maintained expert 
power can be used to create economic growth, and a means for people to find work, 
hence rewarding a compliant society with a legitimate future. Trade and legislation can 
work to bolster economic activity and to enable the population to create an efficient 
productive marketplace. Security will also bolster such an effort. As is mandated by 
society, the state enables a population to make a living for itself under the protection of 
the state.  
Roads / Power.  Roads and electric power are basic infrastructure needs. States 
hold Expert Power in the form of engineering, manufacturing materials, and the decision 
as to where these scarce resources will be distributed. Wielding expert power that 
positively affects enough people will lead to legitimate power. The more the state can 
convince the population that it will remain their source of expertise and care, the more it 
will secure its role as the legitimate authority in the people’s eyes.  
Security. With respect to the people’s security, the state must exercise its 
legitimate power to protect the population from insurgent forces, thereby enabling the 
population to see the state as their legitimate provider. Additionally, the state must 
exercise their coercive power to deny insurgents the ability to sway the populace. 
Roadblocks, control points, and state military patrolling are examples of state action that 
can deny insurgents power, while simultaneously securing the people. These actions will 
serve to endear the people to the state; in response, the state asks for complicity.  
Food. In extreme circumstances, food can be a critical need, particularly if there 
has been extensive infrastructure damage. In such a circumstance, the state holds several 
types of power it can use to secure the population’s compliance, if not loyalty. Reward 
power can be effective.  Often the state maintains the ability to import, secure and 
distribute food, and other commodities. Populations in need of food, who deem the state 
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their best chance for future resources, have incentive to comply with the state. 
Conversely, the state can utilize its coercion cower to deny food supplies, and even 
prevent populations from obtaining food on their own. Expert power can also be useful 
here, as the state maintains access to experts in areas such as agriculture. Subgroups 
without physiological needs or in need of safety will be most receptive to the immediate 
influence of material and welfare services, the type of power typically held by a state 
over citizens. Reward power, in the form of material reward doled out consistently can 
aid to bond those in need to the giver. This tactic is used commonly by groups such as 
Hezbullah in southern Lebanon, who distribute basic humanitarian assistance and civil 
services. In turn, Hezbullah achieves legitimate power as they in many ways, have 
replaced the rightful position of the Lebanese government. As demonstrated by 
Hezbullah, if enough reward power is applied, the result can be legitimacy of the giver.  
F.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore how states can begin the process to 
influence a population into acting favorably toward it, and away from the insurgent. 
Because the population holds critical information about the insurgent, population 
engagement is a critical component of counter-insurgency strategy. The process of 
successfully influencing a population begins only after thorough population analysis, as 
outlined in the preceding chapters.  
The overall methodology presented in this thesis begins with gaining access to the 
population. In a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment, access may not be 
possible until a reasonable level of security has been established. However, once 
established, the next step is to conduct a thorough analysis of the population.  
We began with the identification of groups within a population. Next, the 
population’s needs / motivations must be assessed in order to understand the missing 
components leading to instability. The identification of group affiliation and needs / 
motivations will, in turn, reveal the population’s subgroups.  
Once subgroups are revealed, the COIN effort can prioritize its work by analyzing 
which subgroups to engage in order to achieve overall objectives, and the feasibility of 
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“winning” each. Next, the COIN effort can strategize how best to engage with each 
subgroup, in order to sway it from the insurgent and toward the state.  
The first component of this strategy is the establishment of the population’s trust 
in the state. Where trust may not be possible, the state must bolster its legitimacy by 
establishing itself as predictable. The most important quality is consistency. After the 
priority of effort is assessed, the state must assess its resources and determine the kinds of 
power it has at its disposal to effectively sway each subgroup. Power is used in exchange 
for the compliance of the population. One or more kinds of power framed by French and 
Raven may be leveraged against each subgroup in order to fulfill its needs. The operator 
should be ever careful to not create too great a reliance on the state, or create an 
imbalance across the population. Lastly, these efforts should be synchronized with efforts 
from other operators in the area, including other U.S. agencies, NGOs, and IOs, to reduce 
redundancy, and to ensure all subgroups’ needs are addressed.  
The “3 x 5 P.I.G.S.P.E.E.R. Model” is designed to be applied in any environment 
and to help bridge the gap between strategic theory and tactical implementation.  We 
believe that our methodology can be utilized to increase the operator’s understanding of 
the environment, and improve both non-kinetic and kinetic combat operations.  As a 
COIN force progresses from kinetic combat operations (those attempting to gain a 
security foothold in a non-permissive environment) to operations focused on gaining the 
support of the population, our methodology will aid in collecting human intelligence 
(HUMINT).  Again, this methodology shows that by providing security, working through 
locals, building trust and cooperation, and identifying and capitalizing on opportunities to 
leverage the local populace’s needs, COIN forces will be able to separate the populace 
from the insurgents, precisely target the insurgents, empower the locals to manage their 
own security, and stabilize the environment.  Ultimately, we hope our methodology will 
assist tactical level operators to understand the dynamics of the population whose support 
they are attempting to gain, and help them more effectively develop strategy, plan 





The Graphic Training Aid (GTA) is a pocket reference designed to remind the 
operator of prior training, doctrine, operating procedures or protocols, useful acronyms, 
and checklists. We have designed the GTA below to as a reference for the methodology 
outlined in this thesis.  
The front side is a summary of McCormick’s Mystic Diamond model, important 
needs / motivations (PIG), group affiliation categories (SPEER), Bases of Power, and 
National Elements of Power.  
The back side is a matrix designed for field use. While too small to capture an 
entire population, we intend it to be a starting point for field documentation. 
We encourage the printing, lamination, and use of the PIG SPEER for operators 
in irregular warfare environments. 
McCormick’s Mystic Diamond 
was designed to lay out 
COIN strategy amongst all 
the players. The 3X5 
methodology is designed for 
tactic # 1.
Getting Started
Coercive Power: using leverage to 
force compliance
Legitimate Power: using recognized 
position / official
Expert Power: use of knowledge / 
skill to induce compliance
Reward Power: using ability to offer 
increased material or status  
to gain compliance
Referent Power: using personal or 
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